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The United States housing market was built on a structure of dis-
crimination.1 From bias in lending to exclusionary zoning to state-
sanctioned segregation, discrimination has existed as a pervasive and
constant undertone in housing transactions. As early as 1968, Congress
recognized the danger of racial discrimination in mortgage and housing
terms and enacted the Fair Housing Act ("FHA") to eradicate discrimina-
tion in the sale or rental of dwelling units and property.3 The FHA
sought not only to increase available housing opportunities for racial mi-
norities, but also to "promote integration for the benefit of all Ameri-
cans.' 4 As the scope of the FHA expanded over subsequent decades,
however, the methods and sources of discrimination similarly evolved.
While cases of blatant, intentional discrimination were typical in the
mid-1900s, present forms of discrimination are not so obvious. Rather,
* Adjunct Professor of Law, Wake Forest University; J.D., Wake Forest University
School of Law, 2013; B.A., University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 2011. While
writing this Article, Bethany Corbin worked as an Associate at Bradley Arant Boult
Cummings, LLP, and focused her practice on financial services litigation. The views ex-
pressed in this Article are solely those of the author.
1. Jamelle Bouie, The Next Assault on Civil Rights, SLATE *Oct. 9, 2014, 10:53
AM), http://www.slate.com/articles/newsandpolitics/politics/2014/10/the-supreme_
court s next attack on civil rights thejustices will likely.html; see Rebecca Tracy
Rotem, Note, Using Disparate Impact Analysis in Fair Housing Act Claims. Landlord
Withdrawal From the Section 8 Voucher Program, 78 FORDHAM L. REv. 1971, 1973
(2010).
2. See Bouie, supra note 1.
3. See Dana L. Kaersvang, Note, The Fair Housing Act and Disparate Impact in
Homeowners Insurance, 104 MICH. L. REv. 1993, 1995 (2006) ("Congress recognized
that widespread racial discrimination in the housing market was preventing integration
and interfering with minority access to jobs and quality education.").
4. John F. Stanton, The Fair Housing Act and Insurance: An Update and the Ques-
tion of Disability Discrimination, 31 HOFSTRA L. REv. 141, 145 (2002).
PENN STATE LAW REVIEW
in the contemporary mortgage loan market, discrimination must often be
proven by examining the effects or impact that a particular practice or
decision has on protected classes under the FHA. Such circumstantial
cases almost never involve direct discriminatory evidence.
The difficulty of proving overt discrimination under the FHA has
long been recognized by the judiciary and executive agencies since the
1980s. To ease the burden on consumers and ensure housing participants
act fairly toward minorities, federal courts and the United States Depart-
ment of Housing and Urban Development ("HUD") approved the use of
disparate impact theory under the FHA. Specifically, disparate impact
enables protected minorities to establish a prima facie case of discrimina-
tion by showing that the challenged act or practice had a disproportionate
effect on the minority class; the injured party need not prove the defend-
ant acted with intent to discriminate.
As a result of this relaxed discrimination standard, businesses are
routinely forced to settle disparate impact lawsuits because the reputa-
tional cost of litigating is too great.5 Currently, the Obama Administra-
tion has extracted over $1.1 billion in settlements from the financial ser-
vices industry (specifically mortgage lenders) through the use of
disparate impact litigation.6  For example, the Department of Justice
("DOJ") reached recent settlements with the following lenders: (1) Coun-
trywide Home Loans (now Bank of America, N.A.) for $335 million;
7
(2) Wells Fargo Bank for $175 million; 8 (3) SunTrust Mortgage Inc. for
5. See Disparate Impact Rejected, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 3, 2014, 7:11 PM),
http://online.wsj.com/articles/disparate-impact-rejected- 1415059893.
6. See Supreme Court May Yet Blunt Obama's 'Disparate Impact' Weapon,
AGENDA 21 RADIo (Oct. 19, 2014), http://agenda2lradio.com/?p=12601; see also Trevor
Burrus, How Mischievous Obama Administration Officials Scuttled An Important Su-
preme Court Case, FORBES (Sept. 2, 2013, 10:00 AM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/trevorburrus/2013/09/02/how-mischievous-obama-
administration-officials-scuttled-an-important-supreme-court-case/ (noting that the
Obama Administration "is a big fan of disparate impact theory," has used disparate im-
pact "to extract large settlements from big banks," and "even created an entire unit in the
Justice Department to pursue [disparate impact] claims").
7. Christie Thompson, Disparate Impact and Fair Housing: Seven Cases You
Should Know, PRO PUBLICA (Feb. 12, 2013, 8:00 AM),
http://www.propublica.org/article/disparate-impact-and-fair-housing-seven-cases-you-
should-know; see Press Release, Dep't Justice, Justice Department Reaches $335 Million
Settlement to Resolve Allegations of Lending Discrimination by Countrywide Financial
Corporation, (Dec. 21, 2011), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-reaches-
335-million-settlement-resolve-allegations-lending-discrimination.
8. Thompson, supra note 7; see Charlie Savage, Wells Fargo Will Settle Mortgage
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$21 million;9 and (4) PrimeLending for $2 million. l The threat of dis-
parate impact litigation thus looms heavily over lending institutions and
has become a major source of controversy between the financial services
industry and fair housing advocates.
Despite the historical use of disparate impact theory under the FHA,
the United States District Court for the District of Columbia recently
called into question the legitimacy of disparate impact in the fair housing
context. In American Insurance Association et al., v. U.S. Department of
Housing and Urban Development," Judge Richard Leon held that dis-
parate impact lacked a statutory foundation in the FHA and was therefore
unavailable as a remedy for discrimination.12 Although 11 out of 12 Cir-
cuit Courts of Appeals have affirmed the validity of disparate impact
theory under the FHA, 3 the District Court for the District of Columbia
rejected those opinions and concluded that the FHA contained no effects-
based language to authorize disparate impact.14 This holding effectively
stripped protected minorities of their ability to prove discrimination by
disparate impact under the FHA.
In light of the risks of eliminating disparate impact as a vehicle for
recovery under the FHA, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in the case
of Texas Department of Housing and Community Affairs v. Inclusive
Communities Project to address this precise issue."5 Civil rights activists
closely followed the case, expressing extraordinary concern that the Su-
preme Court could undermine one of the greatest pieces of civil rights
legislation by removing disparate impact as a theory for recovery.'6 This
concern was particularly warranted given that "the Supreme Court has
chipped away at the major provisions and policies of the civil rights era"
9. Thompson, supra note 7; see Press Release, Dep't Justice, Justice Department
Reaches $21 Million Settlement to Resolve Allegations of Lending Discrimination by
SunTrust Mortgage, (May 31, 2012), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-
reaches-2 1 -million-settlement-resolve-allegations-lending-discrimination.
10. Thompson, supra note 7; see Consent Order, United States v. PrimeLending,
No. 3:10-cv-02494-P (N.D. Tex. Jan. 11, 2011),
http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/hce/documents/primelendsettle.pdf.
11. Am. Ins. Ass'n v. U.S. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., 74 F. Supp. 3d 30 (D.D.C.
2014).
12. Id. at 39.
13. See infra note 137.
14. Am. Ins. Ass'n, 74 F. Supp. 3d at 41-43.
15. Tex. Dep't of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S.
Ct. 46 (2014).
16. See, e.g., Emily Badger, The Supreme Court May Soon Disarm the Single Best
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over the last decade.17 However, on June 25, 2015, a deeply divided
Court affirmed the viability of disparate impact under the FHA. While
this ruling is perceived as a maj or win for the Obama Administration, the
rationale and alleged support for the Court's ruling is less than persua-
sive and will have significant ramifications for the financial services in-
dustry.
This Article analyzes the Supreme Court's recent decision on dis-
parate impact under the FHA and highlights why disparate impact is an
inappropriate remedy given the FHA's statutory language. Specifically,
the Article discusses Justice Alito's dissent in depth and elaborates on
the proposition that Congress did not extend the FHA's plain language to
encompass disparate impact theory. Additionally, this Article presents
the realistic ramifications of the Supreme Court's holding on the finan-
cial services industry. In particular, the Article explores lenders' height-
ened exposure to monetary damages and reputational harm, potential ex-
pansion of disparate impact to the Equal Credit Opportunity Act
("ECOA"), and the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau's ("CFPB")
ability to prosecute disparate impact actions under its Unfair Deceptive
and Abusive Acts or Practices ("UDAAP") standard.
To support these arguments, this Article is divided into six parts.
Part I offers a detailed overview of relevant fair lending legislation. Par-
ticularly, this section focuses on the provisions of the FHA, ECOA, and
UDAAP. Part II then analyzes the two primary theories of discrimina-
tion: disparate treatment and disparate impact. The section then transi-
tions into an analysis of how disparate impact has been historically used
under the FHA. Part III details the recent disparate impact decision by
the District Court for the District of Columbia, focusing specifically on
Judge Leon's reasoning for rejecting disparate impact. Part IV then pro-
vides a succinct discussion of the Supreme Court's ruling, including an
examination of both the majority and dissenting opinions. In addition to
detailing this case, Part IV also discusses the Supreme Court's two prior
attempts to adjudicate this subject and explains how the Obama Admin-
istration and civil rights activists successfully settled the cases prior to
oral argument. Part V offers a realistic prediction of the impact FHA
disparate impact claims will have on lenders and financial institutions.
Additionally, this section explains why disparate impact claims may in-
vade the statutory framework of ECOA, and how the CFPB is now
poised to prosecute disparate impact actions under its UDAAP legisla-
tion. Finally, Part VI concludes this Article.
17. Bouie, supra note 1.
[Vol. 120:2
SHOULD I STAY OR SHOULD I Go?
Table of Contents
REGULATORY BACKGROUND ................................................................ 426
A . The Fair H ousing A ct .................................................................. 426
1. Talkin' Bout A Revolution: The Origins of the FHA ........... 427
2. Administering and Enforcing the FHA: Where Are We
T oday? ................................................. .. 4 3 1
B. The Equal Credit Opportunity Act and Regulation B ................. 433
C. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau and Unfair Deceptive
A busive A cts or Practices ............................................................ 435
II. THEORIES OF DISCRIMINATION: DISPARATE TREATMENT AND
D ISPARATE IM PACT .............................................................................. 439
A. A Tale of Two Theories: Disparate Treatment and Disparate
Im p act .......................................................................................... 4 4 0
B. Disparate Impact under the FHA ................................................. 442
III. THE D.C. DISTRICT COURT DEFIES GRAVITY: AN ANALYSIS OF
AMERICAN INSURANCE ASSOCIATION V. UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT ...................... 445
IV. ONE WAY OR ANOTHER: SUPREME COURT REVIEW OF FAIR
HOUSING DISCRIM INATION ................................................................... 448
A. Don't Think Twice, It's All Right: Two Prior Attempts at
Suprem e Court R eview ................................................................ 449
1. The First Case: Magner v. Gallagher .................................... 449
2. The Second Case: Mt. Holly Gardens Citizens in Action,
Inc. v. Tw p. of M t. H olly ....................................................... 452
B. Three Is the Magic Number: The Supreme Court Finally
Tackles D isparate Im pact ............................................................. 454
1. Stayin' Alive: The Majority Saves Disparate Impact
Liability under the FH A ......................................................... 455
i. Statutory Language ......................................................... 456
ii. Congressional FHA mendments and Appellate
P recedent ........................................................................ 458
iii. Legislative Purpose ......................................................... 459
iv. Disparate Impact Limitations ......................................... 460
2. Disparate Impact Should Have Gone "Bye Bye Bye":
Justice Alito Explains Why the Majority Got It Wrong ......... 461
i. Statutory Language Does Not Support Disparate
Im p act ............................................................................. 4 6 1
ii. Congress Only Sought to Eliminate Intentional
D iscrim ination ................................................................ 462
iii. Silence is Not Consent: Congress Did Not Adopt
Judicial Precedent ........................................................... 463
iv. HUD's Disparate Impact Rule Does Not Warrant
D eference ........................................................................ 464
v. Expanding Disparate Impact to the FHA Contravenes
Supreme Court Precedent ............................................... 465
2015]
PENN STATE LAW REVIEW
vi. Unfortunate Consequences ............................................. 465
3. We Took the Wrong Step Years Ago: Justice Thomas'
D issent ................................................................................... 466
V. WRECKING BALL: WHAT THE SUPREME COURT'S HOLDING MEANS
FOR THE FUTURE OF THE FINANCIAL SERVICES INDUSTRY ................... 467
A. Money, Money, Money: Implications of Disparate Impact on
Lenders in FH A Cases ................................................................. 468
B. I Heard It Through the Grapevine: Will Disparate Impact
Expand to EC O A ? ........................................................................ 470
C. Lenders' Kryptonite: The Rise of UDAAP to Curb
D iscrim inatory Lending ............................................................... 474
V I. C ONCLUSION ........................................................................................ 475
I. REGULATORY BACKGROUND
Discriminatory practices in the financial services and housing in-
dustries have long been regulated and governed by federal agencies
tasked with promoting fair and equal opportunities regardless of race,
gender, national origin, or religion. As part of the Civil Rights move-
ment in the 1960s, Congress created and enacted legislative initiatives
aimed at guaranteeing non-discriminatory access to credit and housing.
In particular, Congress passed two federal laws with corresponding im-
plementing regulations that presently govern fair lending practices in the
United States: (1) the Fair Housing Act and applicable HUD regula-
tions;18 and (2) the Equal Credit Opportunity Act and Regulation B.' 9
Recently, however, Congress established the Consumer Financial Protec-
tion Bureau to oversee these legislative initiatives and further regulate
unfair, deceptive, and abusive acts and practices in the financial services
industry. This section analyzes these fundamental pieces of fair lending
legislation and provides a concrete foundation for the upcoming exami-
nation of disparate impact under the FHA and ECOA.
A. The Fair Housing Act
The Fair Housing Act, subsumed within Title VIII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1968, prohibits widespread discrimination in the sale or
rental of housing units and property.20 As passed by Congress, the FHA
criminalizes the refusal to sell or rent any property or dwelling to a per-
18. Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (1968); 24 C.F.R. § § 100.1- 100.90.
19. Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1691; Equal Credit Opportunity Act
(Regulation B), 12 C.F.R. § 202.14.
20. Brian S. Prestes, Comment, Application of the Equal Credit Opportunity Act to
Housing Leases, 67 U. CHI. L. REv. 865, 870 (2000).
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son based on race, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin.21 En-
acted to remedy the damaging effects of racial and residential segrega-
tion, the FHA seeks to establish "truly integrated and balanced living pat-
terns" in place of segregated neighborhoods.22 This laudable goal has
thus transformed the FHA into a tenant's most powerful weapon to fend
off discrimination by potential landlords.23 Given the widespread nature
of the FHA litigation today, this section analyzes the creation and pas-
sage of the FHA and describes the Act's most important provisions and
amendments.
1. Talkin' Bout A Revolution: The Origins of the FHA
Despite the popularity of modern FHA litigation, passage of the
FHA occurred under tense circumstances. Beginning in the 1890s and
lasting until the 1940s, African Americans migrated in substantial num-
bers from the South to the North, settling in urban areas.24 During this
relocation, realtors refused to show African Americans any homes, rental
units, or property in traditionally white neighborhoods.2 The few Afri-
can Americans who succeeded in purchasing homes often experienced
substantial depreciation in the value of their investments due to realtors
using "blockbusting to increase housing prices temporarily in neighbor-
hoods transitioning from white to black.",26 Racially restrictive zoning
regulations and covenants combined with segregated housing projects
further reinforced-and encouraged-housing discrimination across the
United States.27 "White flight" from transitioning neighborhoods addi-
tionally exacerbated the problem and created an epidemic of voluntary
28segregation.
This physical isolation on the basis of race produced unintended so-
cial, economic, and political consequences. African Americans became
culturally and linguistically isolated, with "Black English" vernacular
growing apart from "Standard English.' '29 The lack of social control and
transient nature of the African American population contributed to inef-
21. Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (1968).
22. Eric W. M. Bain, Note, Another Missed Opportunity to Fix Discrimination in
Discrimination Law, 38 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 1434, 1438 (2012).
23. Prestes, supra note 20, at 870.
24. Rotem, supra note 1, at 1975.
25. Kaersvang, supra note 3, at 1995.
26. Id.
27. Bain, supra note 22, at 1438.
28. Id.
29. Some Notes on the Effects of Residential Segregation, and Spatial Isolation,
STAN. UNIV. (Mar. 2013),
http://web.stanford.edu/-mrosenfe/urb-notes-effectssegregation.htm [hereinafter Ef-
fects of Residential Segregation].
2015]
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fective police intervention in segregated neighborhoods and created a
climate conducive to gang and drug operations.30 Because the police re-
sponse to African Americans was unpredictable, rates of violent crime in
black neighborhoods skyrocketed.31 Poverty became concentrated in
neighborhoods known as ghettos, depriving African Americans of the
economic strength to support marketing and retail sectors within their
communities. Additionally, white flight to the suburbs left urban
schools with an insufficient tax base-and thus, inadequate resources-
to fund African American educational needs.33 This segregation further
spurred a conscious governmental policy of redlining, which deprived
African Americans of loan, investment, and credit opportunities in the
inner city and, by extension, the benefits of home ownership.34 By con-
centrating African Americans in ghettos and segregated neighborhoods,
the government encouraged a culture of poverty in the inner cities, iso-
lated African Americans from the bureaucracies controlling their lives,
and intentionally established an atmosphere of alienation and hopeless-
ness.
Despite these obvious negative consequences of racial segregation,
Congress did not address the race problems plaguing the nation until the
riots of 1967 illuminated the potential for explosive rebellions and mobi-
lizations.35 During what became known as the "long hot summer of
1967," the government witnessed a total of 164 race riots in locations as
diverse as New Jersey, Michigan, Florida, Texas, Wisconsin, and Minne-
sota.36 The riots in Detroit and Newark were the most memorable, with
over 2,000 injuries in Detroit and 1,500 injuries in Newark.37 Eight of
30. Id.; see also Raymond Bernard, Consequences of Racial Segregation, 10 Am.
CATH. Soc. REv. 82, 90-91 (1949).
31. Effects of Residential Segregation, supra note 29.
32. Id.; see Bernard, supra note 30, at 94.
33. Effects of Residential Segregation, supra note 29; see Bernard, supra note 30, at
85-86.
34. Effects of Residential Segregation, supra note 29.
35. See Rotem, supra note 1, at 1976 ("The legislative history of the FHA shows
that the riots of the summer of 1967 brought to light the major problems of the nation's
inner cities and spurred Congress to pass the bill."); see also Kaersvang, supra note 3, at
1995 (noting that Congress did not look to the FHA to ease the tension from racial isola-
tion until the race riots of the late 1960s).
36. Corinna Barrett Lain, Countermajoritarian Hero or Zero? Rethinking the War-
ren Court's Role in the Criminal Procedure Revolution, 152 U. PA. L. REv. 1361, 1428
(2004); L.A. Powe, Jr., The Not-So Brave New Constitutional Order, 117 HARv. L. REv.
647, 658 (2003) (reviewing MARK TUSHNET, THE NEW CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER (2003)).
37. See, e.g., Matthew J. Lindsay, How Antidiscrimination Law Learned to Live
with Racial Inequality, 75 U. CIN. L. REv. 87, 97 n.24 (2006) ("Although Watts, in July
1964, and then Detroit and Newark, in the 'long hot summer' of 1967, witnessed the most
spectacular and catastrophic episodes, hundreds of smaller cities across the country also
experienced unprecedented ruptions. The disturbances were responsible for more than
200 deaths and several thousand injuries.").
[Vol. 120:2
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the racial disturbances were serious enough to call in the National
Guard.38 Detroit's riot, in particular, lasted six days, spanned 14 square
miles of ghetto, left 43 people dead, and caused $45 million in property
damage.39 As a result of the widespread destruction from these riots, "it
was only natural for the public, press, and politicians to become alarmed
that the country was 'rapidly approaching a state of anarchy' in the sec-
ond half of 1967."4°
In response to these riots, President Lyndon B. Johnson established
the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders (the "Commis-
sion") to identify the root causes of the uprisings.41 The Commission,
composed of 11 members and more commonly known as the Kemer
Commission, concluded that the United States was moving towards two
separate and unequal societies--one white and one black.42 In a report
published on March 1, 1968, the Commission cited racism and residen-
tial segregation as primary factors contributing to the riots and disorder.43
The report, however, further linked the motivation for the uprisings to
African Americans' feelings of powerlessness and frustration regarding
high rates of unemployment, poverty, police brutality, and inadequate
public services.44 To remedy the chaos devouring inner cities, the Com-
mission recommended the adoption and implementation of comprehen-
45
sive legislative reforms to eradicate housing discrimination at its core.
Although the Commission's report was unwavering in its recom-
mendations, Congress failed to pass the suggested legislation immediate-
ly.46 Rather, it was the extensive lobbying efforts of Senator Edward
38. Lain, supra note 36, at 1428.
39. Id. at 1429.
40. Id.
41. Michael Aleo & Pablo Svirsky, Foreclosure Fallout: The Banking Industry's
Attack on Disparate Impact Race Discrimination Claims Under the Fair Housing Act and
the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 18 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 1, 56 (2008); see U.S. RIOT
COMM'N, REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS 1
(1968), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/Digitization/8073NCJRS.pdf
42. REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS, supra
note 41, at 1; see Vernon M. Briggs, Jr., Report of the National Advisory Commission on
Civil Disorders: A Review Article, 2 J. ECON. ISSUES 200, 200 (1968).
43. REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS, supra
note 41, at 5 ("Race prejudice has shaped our history decisively; it now threatens to affect
our future. White racism is essentially responsible for the explosive mixture which has
been accumulating in our cities since the end of World War II."); Aleo & Svirsky, supra
note 41, at 56; Briggs, Jr., supra note 42, at 200 ("The main culprit is said to be 'white
racism."').
44. REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS, supra
note 41, at 5.
45. Id. at 13; Aleo & Svirsky, supra note 41, at 56.
46. It is important to note that while the Commission had a substantial impact on
creating separate and independent federal housing regulations, the effort to introduce a
form of fair housing legislation actually began as early as 1966. Kirk D. Jensen & Jeffrey
2015]
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Brooke, the first African American senator to be elected by popular vote,
and Martin Luther King, Jr., that forever turned the tide on housing dis-
crimination.47 While Senator Brooke partnered with Senator Edward
Kennedy to publicize his personal experience of returning from World
War II and being denied housing based on race, Martin Luther King, Jr.
organized and participated in open housing marches across the nation.48
This publicity brought racial discrimination back to the forefront of pub-
lic consciousness.
In early April 1968, the Senate passed the Fair Housing Act by an
exceedingly slim margin and sent the bill to the House of Representa-
tives for review. The House of Representatives, however, had grown in-
creasingly conservative as a result of the urban unrest, and politicians
predicted defeat of the bill at the House level. While defeat appeared
imminent, the unexpected assassination of Martin Luther King, Jr. on
April 4, 1968, served as the catalyst for President Johnson to finally push
the fair housing bill through Congress as a "last tribute to King. '49 Thus,
just seven days after Martin Luther King, Jr.'s death, the House quickly
passed the FHA without debate.5 °
Upon enacting the FHA, Senator Walter Mondale, the primary
sponsor of the Act, expressed in the congressional record that the FHA
was necessary "'to correct the enduring effects' of discriminatory gov-
ernmental action."5 This remark mirrored the lengthy floor debate in the
P. Naimon, The Fair Housing Act, Disparate Impact Claims, and Magner v. Gallagher:
An Opportunity to Return to the Primacy of the Statutory Text, 129 BANKING L.J. 99, 115
(2012). In 1966, Congress, at the behest of President Johnson, introduced Title IV of the
Civil Rights Act of 1966. Id. "Title IV contained a provision for a Fair Housing Board
that could hear and adjudicate complaints of violations of the Act." Id. In its original
form, Title IV barred racial discrimination in the sale and rental of all housing. While the
House passed the bill on August 9, 1966 after amendment and attack, the Senate killed
the bill through filibuster on September 19, 1966. Charles McC. Mathias, Jr. & Marion
Morris, Fair Housing Legislation: Not an Easy Row to Hoe, 4 CITYSCAPE 21, 21-24
(1999), http://www.huduser.org/portalUPeriodicals/CITYSCPE/VOL4NUM3/mathias.pdf.
For a more in depth discussion of the housing provisions in Title IV, see 1966 Civil
Rights Act Dies in Senate, 22 CQ ALMANAC 450, 450-72 (1966),
http://library.cqpress.com/cqalmanac/document.php?id=cqal66- 1301767.
47. Bain, supra note 22, at 1439.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 1439-40.
50. Id. at 1440; see Matthew Jordan Cochran, Fairness in Disparity: Challenging
the Application of Disparate Impact Theory in Fair Housing Claims Against Insurers, 21
GEO. MASON U. CIv. RTS. L.J. 159, 161 (2011); see also Stacy E. Seicshnaydre, Is the
Road to Disparate Impact Paved with Good Intentions?: Stuck on State of Mind in Anti-
discrimination Law, 42 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 1141, 1172 (2007).
51. Aleo & Svirsky, supra note 41, at 56; see generally Bain, supra note 22, at 1438
(explaining that Senator Mondale introduced the FHA bill to eliminate all discriminatory
practices employed by property owners, real estate brokers, home financers, and build-
ers); Cochran, supra note 50, at 161.
[Vol. 120:2
SHOULD I STAY OR SHOULD I Go?
Senate concerning the negative effects of discrimination in housing.52
Therefore, consistent with these comments, the original version of the
FHA contained no express language requiring a showing of discriminato-
ry intent before recovering damages under the Act.53 Perplexingly, how-
ever, the text of the FHA does not expressly prohibit conduct having a
discriminatory effect on protected minorities.
2. Administering and Enforcing the FHA: Where Are We Today?
While passage of the FHA represented a significant victory for civil
rights activists, the Act did not remain static or untouched for long.
Congress explicitly expanded the FHA's anti-discrimination provisions
on two unique occasions. First, in 1974, Congress amended the FHA to
include sex as a protected class.54 Second, Congress increased the
FHA's scope by passing the Fair Housing Amendments Act in 1988,
which banned housing discrimination on the basis of familial status and
disability.55 These revisions strengthened the FHA for the benefit of all
Americans by broadening its scope of applicability. Signifying a con-
gressionally protected right to be free from housing discrimination and
enjoy independent living, these amendments ransformed the FHA into a
true piece of civil rights legislation beyond its previously limited racial
context.56
In addition to amending the text of the FHA, Congress entrusted the
interpretation and enforcement of the FHA's provisions to a separate
regulatory body beginning in 1988.57 The executive agency, the De-
partment of Housing and Urban Development (known as HUD), possess-
es broad authority to issue federal regulations and rules related to the
FHA and initiate claims under the Act.58 The department's primary re-
52. Aleo & Svirsky, supra note 41, at 56-57 ("Throughout the lengthy floor debate
concerning the Fair Housing Act (Title VIII) in the Senate, a number of Senators spoke to
the significance of the Act in eliminating the negative effects of discrimination in hous-
ing."); see also Equal Justice Soc'y et al., Lessons from Mt. Holly: Leading Scholars
Demonstrate Need for Disparate Impact Standard to Combat Implicit Bias, 11 HASTINGS
RACE & POVERTY L.J. 241, 245 (2014) ("In enacting the FHA, Congress emphasized the
harmful effects of housing discrimination.").
53. Bain, supra note 22, at 1440.
54. Stanton, supra note 4, at 145.
55. Id.; see also Cochran, supra note 50, at 161 (stating that "[s]ex and familial sta-
tus have since been added to the list of protected classes").
56. See Stanton, supra note 4, at 145.
57. The Fair Housing Act was amended in 1988 to authorize HUD to enforce the
Act through the issuance of rules. See Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Cisneros, 52 F.3d
1351, 1354 (6th Cir. 1995).
58. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc. v. Tex. Dep't of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs, 747 F.3d
275, 282 (5th Cir. 2014); Lopez v. City of Dall., Tex., No. 3:03-CV-2223-M, 2004 WL
2026804, at *8 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 9, 2004); Jensen & Naimon, supra note 46, at 131-32;
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sponsibility is to ensure equal access to housing and "create strong, sus-
tainable, inclusive communities" that are free from discrimination.5 9 As
such, this federal agency is the primary enforcer and interpreter of the
FHA's text.
In light of the significant protections afforded by the FHA and the
strong regulatory authority of HUD, Congress established three avenues
for relief under the Act. First, a victim may file a complaint with HUD
setting forth detailed facts and allegations of improper treatment and dis-
crimination.6 ° HUD, through the Office of Fair Housing and Equal Op-
portunity ("FHEO"), then conducts a thorough investigation. If the com-
plaint has merit, the FHEO moves to resolve the dispute "through
informal methods of conference, conciliation, and persuasion.,61 Com-
plaints that are not successfully conciliated require the FHEO to deter-
mine whether reasonable cause exists to support a finding of discrimina-
62tory intent. When reasonable cause is found, HUD issues a
Determination and a Charge of Discrimination to all parties listed in the
Complaint.63 A hearing is then scheduled before a HUD administrative
law judge. Either party, however, may terminate the administrative pro-
ceeding and elect to litigate the claim in federal court.64 If the adminis-
trative proceeding is terminated, the Department of Justice takes over
HUD's role as counsel seeking resolution of the charge.65  Second, the
Attorney General may elect to independently initiate suit against a realtor
or agent in response to widespread discriminatory housing practices.
66
These cases are typically based on a "pattern or practice" of denying Ti-
tle VIII rights or an "issue of general public importance.67 Such action
Aleo & Svirsky, supra note 41, at 60; see Trafficante v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S.
205, 208 (1972) ("The Act gives the Secretary of HUD power to receive and investigate
complaints regarding discriminatory housing practices.").
59. Mission, HUD, http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/HUD?src=/about/mission (last
visited Jan. 11, 2014).
60. Frank Lopez, Note, Using the Fair Housing Act to Combat Predatory Lending,
6 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL'Y 73, 92 (1999).
61. Id. (quoting Jane McGrew et al., Washington Lawyers' Committee for Civil
Rights Under the Law: Fair Housing, 27 How. L.J. 1291,1319 (1984)).






66. Lopez, supra note 60, at 92.
67. Id. at 92-93; see Trafficante v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 210 (1972)
("So far as federal agencies are concerned only the Attorney General may sue; yet, as
noted, he may sue only to correct 'a pattern or practice' of housing discrimination.").
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is rare and represents an infrequently used avenue of prosecution.68 Fi-
nally, an individual may assert a private right of action against an of-
fender without involvement from HUD or the Attorney General.69
In cases involving private enforcement of the FHA's anti-
discrimination provisions, an affected individual must engage in a three-
step analysis. First, the plaintiff must show that she is a member of a
statutorily protected class who applied for and was qualified to purchase
or rent housing when her application was denied.7° The dwelling, rental
unit, or property must further have remained available following the de-
nial of the plaintiff's application.71 Second, the defendant may defeat the
plaintiff's claim by proving that the denial of plaintiffs application was
based on permissible considerations unrelated to the plaintiff's status as a
protected class member.72 Finally, the plaintiff may establish that the de-
fendant's claimed motivation was merely a pretext for prohibited dis-
crimination.73 Most claims brought pursuant to this three-step frame-
work assert discrimination under either the disparate impact theory
(discriminatory effect) or the disparate treatment theory (intentional dis-
crimination).74
B. The Equal Credit Opportunity Act and Regulation B
Following enactment of the FHA, Congress passed the Equal Credit
Opportunity Act on October 28, 1974, to address gender and marital dis-
crimination in the context of consumer credit.75 Prior to 1974, married
women were required to obtain their husband's guarantee on any applica-
tion for a loan. Despite the woman's credit history or income, it was
common practice for creditors to refuse to extend individual credit to a
woman without her husband's signature. In a report dated December
1972, the National Commission on Consumer Finance xpressed disap-
proval at the denial of credit based solely on characteristics such as sex,
68. See Trafficante, 409 U.S. at 211 (explaining that the "role of the Attorney Gen-
eral in the matter [is] minimal" and "the main generating force must be private suits").
69. Lopez, supra note 60, at 93.
70. Prestes, supra note 20, at 870. Consumed within this first requirement are four
implicit steps. First, the discrimination must be attributable to the plaintiff's protected
category-race, religion, sex, national origin, familial status, or disability. Lopez, supra
note 60, at 93. Second, the discrimination must have occurred within the context of a
rental or sale of real estate. Id. Third, the specific transaction between the plaintiff and
the defendant must fall within the scope of the FHA. Id. Finally, the plaintiff must satis-
fy her burden of proof. Id. If the plaintiff meets all of these requirements, she will have
established a primafacie case of discrimination.
71. Prestes, supra note 20, at 870.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 870-71.
74. Stanton, supra note 4, at 165.
75. See Prestes, supra note 20, at 868.
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76race, or occupation. The report disclosed that underrepresented
groups-particularly women-promised to be an increasingly profitable
market but creditors remained slow in adopting non-discriminatory prac-
tices.77 In subsequent legislative hearings, the Senate reported no fewer
than 13 types of credit discrimination based on sex and marital status
prevalent in the credit industry.78 These findings prompted Congress to
enact ECOA to eradicate discrimination among lending institutions.79
As originally enacted, ECOA provided the Federal Reserve Board
with the responsibility for creating and prescribing an implementing reg-
ulation to effectuate its non-discriminatory mandate.80 The Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System subsequently issued Regula-
tion B to implement and enforce the fair credit guidelines established un-
der ECOA.8' Regulation B outlines mandatory rules lenders and lending
institutions must adhere to when obtaining and processing applications
for loans or dealing with sensitive credit information.8 2 Applying to all
persons "who, in the ordinary course of business, regularly participate[]
in the credit decision, including setting the terms of the credit," Regula-
tion B governs lending conduct for all aspects of an applicant's interac-
tions with a creditor, including information requests, investigation proce-
dures, creditworthiness standards, termination or rejection of credit, fur-
furnishing credit information, and terms of credit.8 3 If a lender rejects a
credit application, it must provide a written notice of rejection to the ap-
plicant and explain why credit was denied.84 Although ECOA and Regu-
lation B initially only barred credit discrimination based on sex and mari-
tal status, Congress enacted the ECOA Amendments in 1976, which
significantly expanded the scope of prohibited conduct to include dis-
crimination based on age, race, color, national origin, religion, receipt of
public assistance benefits, and the exercise of rights under the Consumer
Credit Protection Act.
85
76. Susan Smith Blakely, Credit Opportunity for Women: The ECOA and Its Ef-
fects, 1981 Wis. L. REV. 655, 659 (1981).
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. ECOA was enacted as Subchapter IV of the Consumer Credit Protection Act.
80. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, CFPB SUP. AND EXAM. MANUAL 1.1 1 (2013),
http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201306_cfpb_laws-and-regulationsecoa-combined-
june-2013.pdf, see also BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE, CONSUMER COMPLI-
ANCE HANDBOOK, FEDERAL FAIR LENDING REGULATIONS AND STATUTES EQUAL CREDIT
OPPORTUNITY (REGULATION B) 1 (2006),
http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/supmanual/cch/fair-lendregb.pdf.
81. See CONSUMER COMPLIANCE HANDBOOK, supra note 80, at 1.
82. See id. at 1-6.
83. 12 C.F.R. § 1002.2(1) (2015).
84. 12 C.F.R. § 202.9(a)(2) (2015).
85. Blakely, supra note 76, at 662-63.
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Comparable to the FHA, ECOA and Regulation B provide both pri-
vate and governmental rights of enforcement. Any individual harmed by
a creditor's violations of ECOA may bring a private lawsuit against the
creditor, who is liable for compensatory damages, attorneys' fees, and
costs of a successful suit.86 A consumer has two years after the occur-
rence of the discriminatory conduct to initiate a lawsuit.87 Congress,
however, was not confident that consumers would always protect and en-
force their own rights; therefore, it provided concurrent enforcement
powers to the Attorney General of the United States.88 If the agencies
responsible for ECOA's enforcement cannot obtain lender compliance
with the Act, they may refer the matter to the Attorney General and in-
clude a recommendation that a civil action be instituted. Additionally,
the Attorney General may act independently to initiate a civil action, in-
cluding an action for injunctive relief, if there is reason to believe a
creditor has engaged in a pattern or practice in violation of ECOA.89
Like the FHA, this discriminatory conduct typically takes the form of ei-
ther disparate impact or disparate treatment.
C. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau and Unfair Deceptive
Abusive Acts or Practices
While the FHA and ECOA represented significant steps to curb dis-
criminatory lending practices, federal regulators nonetheless continually
"shied away from the shadow banking industry that had abused consum-
er trust with impunity.' 9° A patchwork of federal agencies existed to
govern various aspects of the financial system; however, these agencies
were unorganized and focused on consumer safety and credit soundness
rather than consumer protection.91 Prior to the 2008 financial crisis, non-
bank providers of financial products and services were not subject to
oversight or federal supervisory authority, and fragmented jurisdiction
prevented federal regulators from conducting meaningful investigations
of banking institutions.92 This regulatory gap permitted state legislators
and state attorney generals to legislate and sue banking institutions pri-
marily with an "eye toward buying in-state votes with the money of out-
86. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691e(a), (d) (2012).
87. Blakely, supra note 76, at 663.
88. Id.
89. THOMAS E. PEREZ, THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S 2012 ANNUAL REPORT TO CON-
GRESS PURSUANT TO THE EQUAL CREDIT OPPORTUNITY ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1976 2 (July
2013), http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/hce/documents/ecoareports/ecoareport20l2.pdf.
90. Dylan J. Castellino, A Spotlight on Shadow Banking: The CFPB Finalizes Pro-
cedures to Supervise Risky Nonbanks, 18 N.C. BANKING INST. 333, 333 (2014).
91. Todd Zywicki, The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau: Savior or Men-
ace?, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 856, 857-58 (2013).
92. Castellino, supra note 90, at 335.
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of-state banks while also balkanizing the consumer banking system.,
93
This political motivation drove state enforcement of consumer protection
laws, and such enforcement was often arbitrary and irregular. As a re-
sult, despite the widespread nature of consumer protection regulation at
both the state and federal levels, no unifying regulator existed to ensure
consistent and lawful enforcement of protection standards or to develop a
cohesive consumer protection strategy. Subsequently, in 2008, the Unit-
ed States experienced a debilitating financial crisis, which burst the hous-
ing bubble and threatened the collapse of large financial institutions in
part because of high-risk financial products, overvaluation of subprime
mortgages, and the failure of regulators to control market practices.
In response to this financial crisis, Congress enacted the Dodd-
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 ("Dodd-
Frank Act"), which transferred regulatory authority for ECOA and other
federal legislation to the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau.94 Con-
gress created the CFPB to more effectively regulate consumer financial
products and services;95 however, in doing so, Congress sent the CFPB
into uncharted waters. Prior to the 2008 financial crisis, non-bank pro-
viders of financial products and services were not subject to oversight or
federal supervisory authority, and fragmented jurisdiction prevented fed-
eral regulators from conducting meaningful investigations of banking in-
stitutions.96 The Dodd-Frank Act thus granted the CFPB supervisory au-
thority and jurisdiction over bank and non-bank institutions in an effort
to establish a comprehensive regulatory regime to prevent future finan-
cial crises.97 This concept of a new consumer financial protection agen-
cy was a centerpiece of President Barack Obama's financial regulatory
reform program, and was first proposed by Elizabeth Warren in 2007.98
Termed the "new consumer watchdog," the CFPB's primary pur-
pose is to "prevent unfair, deceptive, and abusive financial practices, and
to level the playing field between depository and non-depository institu-
93. Zywicki, supra note 91, at 858.
94. See CFPB Sup. AND ExAM. MANUAL 1. 1, supra note 80, at 1. The CFPB is a bu-
reau within the Federal Reserve Board with financial independence.
95. See Jean Braucher, Form and Substance in Consumer Financial Protection, 7
BROOK. J. CORP. FiN. & COM. L. 107, 109 (2012).
96. Castellino, supra note 90, at 335.
97. See id. at 337. Although the CFPB possesses authority over bank and non-bank
institutions, this jurisdiction is limited. The CFPB may only supervise banks and credit
unions that possess more than $10 billion in assets. Banks possessing less than $10 bil-
lion in assets are primarily supervised by federal banking regulators, though the CFPB
may, in certain instances, retain concurrent jurisdiction. Id. With regards to non-bank in-
stitutions, the CFPB may only regulate certain "covered persons," defined as any entity
that "engages in offering or providing a consumer financial product or service." Id. (quot-
ing 12 U.S.C. § 5481(6) (2012)).
98. Zywicki, supra note 91, at 860-61.
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tions that offer consumer financial products and services."99 As such, an
important goal of the CFPB is to provide consumers with access to fi-
nancial services in fair and transparent markets.00 The CFPB is there-
fore authorized to administer and enforce federal consumer financial
laws and, to the extent the CFPB's rulemaking or enforcement authority
conflicts with that of another agency, the CFPB possesses a superior
claim.01 That said, states are permitted to supplement the CFPB's rule-
making and enforcement efforts.
Among the CFPB's most substantive-and arguably threatening-
powers is its ability to regulate unfair, deceptive, or abusive acts or prac-
tices.102 According to the Dodd-Frank Act, conduct is considered "un-
fair" when: "(1) [i]t causes or is likely to cause substantial injury to con-
sumers; (2) [t]he injury is not reasonably avoidable by consumers; and
(3) [t]he injury is not outweighed by the countervailing benefits to con-
sumers or to competition."'1 3 The term "injury" encompasses monetary
harm, such as fees and costs paid by the consumer as a result of the un-
fair practice, but also extends to severe emotional distress.'0 4 Actual in-
jury is not required so long as there is a significant risk of concrete
harm.0 5 The CFPB deems an injury "not reasonably avoidable" if the
practices hinder a consumer's ability to make informed decisions about
the credit transaction or interferes with a consumer's ability to avoid that
injury. °6 As a matter of practice, the CFPB has determined that an inju-
ry caused by transactions that occur without a consumer's knowledge or
an injury that can only be avoided by spending large amounts of money
or resources is not reasonably avoidable.'0 7
Similarly, an act or practice is deemed deceptive if: (1) the repre-
sentation, act, or omission, is likely to mislead consumers; (2) the con-
sumer's interpretation of the act or omission is reasonable under the cir-
cumstances; and (3) the misleading information or practice is material.
10 8
99. Castellino, supra note 90, at 336.
100. Id.; see Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Dodd-Frank Act's Expansion of State Au-
thority to Protect Consumers of Financial Services, 36 J. CORP. L. 893, 895 (2011)
("CFPB's mission is to 'help protect consumers from unfair, deceptive, and abusive acts
that so often trap them in unaffordable financial products."').
101. Castellino, supra note 90, at 340.
102. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, CFPB BULLETIN 2013-07: PROHIBITION OF UN-
FAIR, DECEPTIVE, OR ABUSIVE ACTS OR PRACTICES IN THE COLLECTION OF CONSUMER
DEBTS 2 (2013), http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201307_cfpb-bulletin-unfair-
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To determine whether an act or practice is deceptive, the CFPB must
evaluate the conduct within the context of the entire course of dealing or
transaction to decide whether the net impression is deceptive.'0 9 The
CFPB may not view the act in isolation. Deception is additionally de-
termined by analyzing the conduct from the perception of a reasonable
member of the target audience. 110 Exaggerated claims or puffery are not
deceptive if a reasonable consumer would not take the representation se-
riously. Moreover, the deceptive act or representation must be materi-
al-i.e., it must be likely to affect a consumer's choice or conduct re-
garding a product or service.11' Any information a consumer would
deem important to a transaction is considered material.
Finally, Congress added the term "abusive" to UDAAP in an effort
to create a broader standard of regulation beyond the simple prohibition
of unfair or deceptive acts. Although "abusive" means something differ-
ent than unfair or deceptive, the CFPB and Congress have failed to pro-
vide a solid, concrete definition for the term.1 12 Rather, the proffered
definition is situational and subjective, and is dependent upon the facts
and circumstances of the case.1 3 No legislative history exists to suggest
what the term might mean, and the CFPB is permitted to alter the defini-
tion of any term at will.
114
While the CFPB's UDAAP standards appear amorphous and unset-
tled, the CFPB refuses to issue rules that define or describe which acts or
practices qualify as unfair, abusive, or deceptive.1 5 Rather, the CFPB
casts a wide net for UDAAP and makes clear that complying with all
federal consumer protection regulations is not sufficient to avoid
UDAAP claims. 16 This limited guidance from the CFPB establishes
UDAAP claims as a "know it when [you] see it" standard, particularly
given the scarcity of binding legal precedent on this topic.117 The unde-
fined boundaries of UDAAP are concerning because the CFPB may seek
civil penalties for violations of its laws and regulations. 118
While the CFPB is the sole enforcer of UDAAP, states have created
their own UDAAP counterparts that allow for local and private enforce-
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 3-4.
112. Castellino, supra note 90, at 354; Zywicki, supra note 91, at 918.
113. Castellino, supra note 90, at 354-55.
114. Zywicki, supra note 91, at 918.
115. MORRISON & FOERSTER, THE CFPB & UDAAP: A "KNOW IT WHEN YOU SEE
IT" STANDARD? 1 (June 2014).
116. Id.
117. Id. at 1-2.
118. See Jared Elosta, Dynamic Federalism and Consumer Financial Protection:
How the Dodd-Frank Act Changes the Preemption Debate, 89 N.C. L. REv. 1273, 1289
(2011).
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ment.119 Every state has a law prohibiting unfair and deceptive trade
practices,12 0 and the primary difference between state unfair and decep-
tive acts and practices ("UDAP") and UDAAP lies in the consumer's
ability to sue for injury. Each state's UDAP statute is a variant on the
federal model, but consumers are permitted to sue for monetary damages
under the state legislation.121 This two-tiered enforcement structure for
unfair and deceptive behavior means that lending and banking institu-
tions may be liable for damages at both the state and federal levels for
conduct that is imprecisely defined and constantly evolving. 1
22
II. THEORIES OF DISCRIMINATION: DISPARATE TREATMENT AND
DISPARATE IMPACT
Understanding the prohibitions of the FHA, ECOA, and numerous
other regulatory frameworks requires an exploration of the multi-faceted
structure of discrimination. Discrimination, which is defined as an action
that denies social participation or fundamental rights to certain categories
of people based on prejudice or specific characteristics, is a pervasive
evil that has permeated all aspects of society from ancient to modem. 1
23
Perceived almost as a global constant, discrimination has evolved and
assumed numerous forms over the course of history. Yet, despite activ-
ism and social progress towards the eradication of discrimination, dis-
criminatory conduct has not disappeared; it has merely changed form.
This section analyzes the two prominent categories of discrimination:
disparate treatment and disparate impact. Further, this section chronicles
the use of these two discriminatory forms within the FHA. Through this
119. See NAT'L CONSUMER LAW CENTER, CONSUMER PROTECTION IN THE STATES:
STATE-BY-STATE SUMMARIES OF STATE UDAP STATUTES (2009), available at
https://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/udap/analysis-state-summaries.pdf.
120. See id.
121. Michael R. Pfeifer, Dodd-Frank's UDAAPS-Have We Lost Our Way?,
MORTG. COMPLIANCE MAG., (Dec. 9, 2013),
http://www.mortgagecompliancemagazine.com/featured/dodd-franks-udaaps-lost-way/;
Jeffrey Naimon et al., Under the Microscope: A Brief History of UDAP Laws and Predic-
tionsfor Post-Dodd Frank Developments, 14 CONSUMER FIN. SERVS. L. REP. 3, 4 (2010),
http://www.buckleysandler.com/uploads/36/doc/cfs1411 .pdf; Travis P. Nelson, Emerging
Issues in UDAP: Preemption, AM. BAR Assoc. (2008),
http://apps.americanbar.org/buslaw/committees/CL130000pub/newsletter/200803/nelson-
b.pdf.
122. See NAT'L CONSUMER L. CTR., THE ROLE OF THE STATES UNDER THE DODD-
FRANK WALL STREET REFORM AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT OF 2010 1-4 (2010),
https://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/legislation/dodd-frank-role-of-the-states.pdf; Pfeifer,
supra note 121 ("Even more significantly, under state UDAP and other state consumer
protection statutes, claims by private litigants may be available for violation of Federal
UDAAPs.").
123. Discrimination, MERRIAM WEBSTER DICTIONARY (2014), http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/discrimination.
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analysis, this section provides the foundation for understanding the rise
of disparate impact theory as a method of recovery in the financial ser-
vices industry.
A. A Tale of Two Theories: Disparate Treatment and Disparate Impact
Within the financial services industry, the two most prevalent meth-
ods of discrimination have long been identified as disparate treatment
and disparate impact. Disparate treatment operates as an intent-based
theory of discrimination in which the injured party must show that the
defendant possessed a discriminatory motive for taking a certain ac-
tion.124 This action, in turn, must result in unfavorable treatment of the
plaintiff and be undertaken after consideration of impermissible crite-
ria.125 Depending on the statute, impermissible criteria may encompass
race, religion, national origin, sex, familial status, and receipt of public
health benefits. The focus of any disparate treatment case is the defend-
ant's mens rea or state of mind, and proof of intent to discriminate is ab-
solutely crucial to establishing a prima facie case of discrimination.
126
This proof of intent can be either circumstantial or direct, but "need not
be so direct and uncontrovertible [sic] as 'smoking gun' evidence to
compel a rebuttal by the defendant.'' 127 Thus, disparate treatment liabil-
ity depends on whether a protected trait motived the defendant's deci-
sion-making process and had a material influence on the outcome of the
decision.
128
In contrast to disparate treatment, disparate impact theory does not
question the defendant's motivation or intent for performing discrimina-
tory conduct. Rather, a disparate impact claim is established when the
defendant's practices disproportionately affect a protected class.129 In
other words, if a facially neutral policy unjustifiably impacts protected
minority groups when applied, those protected individuals may file suit
124. Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 577 (2009).
125. See id.
126. See Eastland v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 704 F.2d 613, 618 (11 th Cir. 1983); see al-
so Lewis v. City of Chi., Ill., 560 U.S. 205, 214-15 (2010).
127. Green v. USX Corp., 896 F.2d 801, 807 (3d Cir. 1990) (citing Green v. USX
Corp., 843 F.2d 1511, 1526 (3d Cir. 1988)) (emphasis omitted); see also Glenn v. Brum-
by, 663 F.3d 1312, 1320 (1lth Cir. 2011); Beauford v. Sisters of Mercy-Province of De-
troit, Inc., 816 F.2d 1104, 1108 (6th Cir. 1987); Moore v. City of Charlotte, 754 F.2d
1100, 1105 (4th Cir. 1985).
128. See Ricci, 557 U.S. at 577; see also Wood v. City of San Diego, 678 F.3d 1075,
1081 (9th Cir. 2012); EEOC v. Joe's Stone Crab, Inc., 220 F.3d 1263, 1273 (1 1th Cir.
2000).
129. Ricci, 557 U.S. at 577.
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for recovery under the disparate impact theory.130 The disproportionate
impact is routinely established through proof of statistical disparities. In
particular, statistical evidence is gathered through studies that compare
the practical effects of a facially neutral policy on affected minority
groups and the general population.13' Comparisons that reveal that a
seemingly neutral policy adversely affects the protected class serve as
prime foundations for disparate impact suits. In this manner, disparate
impact covers unintentional discrimination and does not require a mens
rea element. 1
32
In both disparate treatment and disparate impact claims, however,
obtaining direct proof of discrimination is extremely difficult. 3 3 Ac-
knowledging that almost no discrimination suit would be successful in
the absence of circumstantial evidence, courts adopted a burden-shifting
mechanism to ease the plaintiffs evidentiary hardship. This test, termed
the McDonnell-Douglas test in employment discrimination cases,134 af-
fords a plaintiff the opportunity to establish a prima facie case of dis-
crimination by eliminating common, non-discriminatory explanations for
the defendant's act or practice in three steps. First, the plaintiff must
show that a challenged practice or policy has a disproportionately ad-
verse impact on a protected class.135  After this requisite showing, the
burden shifts to the defendant to rebut the plaintiffs case by offering
proof of a legitimate business justification for the challenged act or prac-
tice.136 During this step, the defendant must establish that the act, proce-
dure, or policy is a business necessity.137 Even if the defendant proves
that business necessity justifies the policy, the burden shifts back to the
130. See Bouie, supra note 1 ("Another way to understand disparate impact is this:
It's a way to confront the realities of racial inequality without trying to prove the motiva-
tions of an institution, organization, or landlord.").
131. See Disparate Impact Rejected, supra note 5.
132. See id. ("Disparate-impact legal theory relies on racial statistical disparities in
lending, housing, or other business practice without having to show evidence of actual
discriminatory intent.").
133. See, e.g., Alan M. White, Borrowing While Black: Applying Fair Lending Laws
to Risk-Based Mortgage Pricing, 60 S.C. L. REv. 677, 693 (2009) ("Direct proof that a
lender denied loans or set terms because of an applicant's race is rarely available.").
134. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
135. See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975); McDonnell
Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 802; Graoch Assocs. # 33, L.P. v. Louisville/Jefferson Cty.
Metro Human Relations Comm'n, 508 F.3d 366, 374 (6th Cir. 2007).
136. See McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 802; Graoch Assocs., 508 F.3d at
374; Nat'l Fair Hous. All., Inc. v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 208 F. Supp. 2d 46, 60
(D.D.C. 2002).
137. See, e.g., Affordable Hous. Dev. Corp. v. City of Fresno, 433 F.3d 1182, 1195
(9th Cir. 2006); Oti Kaga, Inc. v. S.D. Hous. Dev. Auth., 342 F.3d 871, 883 (8th Cir.
2003).
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plaintiff to show the availability of a less discriminatory practice.1 38 If
the plaintiff satisfies both of its burdens, he or she has established a pri-
ma facie case of discrimination sufficient to warrant jury consideration.
B. Disparate Impact under the FHA
While it is unquestionable that the FHA and consumer financial
protection laws prohibit intentional discrimination, it is disparate impact
that "has been at the bedrock" of fair housing and fair lending enforce-
ment for the past four decades.3 9 Judicial and agency interpretations of
the FHA have discerned an implicit prohibition against discriminatory
effects, and similarly have found unlawful conduct resulting in a dispar-
ate impact based on protected characteristics. Eleven federal circuit
courts of appeals have addressed the applicability of disparate impact
under the FHA and unambiguously concluded that it provides a vehicle
for redress.140 Only the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals has yet to weigh
in on the issue. Nonetheless, a recent D.C. District Court opinion cast
doubt on the availability of disparate impact as a viable theory of recov-
ery under the FHA. This section analyzes judicial and agency inter-
pretations of disparate impact under the FHA to better shed light on the
disparate impact dispute.
Recognition of disparate impact within the context of the FHA be-
gan in 1974 when the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals explicitly permit-
ted a disparate impact discrimination lawsuit under the Act.142  Since
then, federal courts across the United States have applied the disparate
impact standard in evaluating discrimination claims under the FHA and
other financial services regulations, particularly ECOA. Of the 12 circuit
courts of appeals, 11 approve using disparate impact as a method of re-
covery under the FHA and hold that discriminatory housing practices
138. See McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 802; Graoch Assocs., 508 F.3d at
374; Nat'l Fair Hous. All., Inc., 208 F. Supp. 2d at 60.
139. Bouie, supra note 1.
140. See, e.g., Langlois v. Abington Hous. Auth., 207 F.3d 43, 49-50 (lst Cir.
2000); Huntington Branch, NAACP v. Town of Huntington, 844 F.2d 926, 935-36 (2d
Cir. 1988); Resident Advisory Bd. v. Rizzo, 564 F.2d 126, 146-47 (3d Cir. 1977); Smith
v. Town of Clarkton, 682 F.2d 1055, 1065 (4th Cir. 1982); Hanson v. Veterans Admin.,
800 F.2d 1381, 1386 (5th Cir. 1986); Arthur v. City of Toledo, 782 F.2d 565, 574-75
(6th Cir. 1986); Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Vill. of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283,
1290 (7th Cir. 1977); United States v. City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179, 1184-85 (8th
Cir. 1974); Halet v. Wend Inv. Co., 672 F.2d 1305, 1311 (9th Cir. 1982); Mountain Side
Mobile Estates P'ship v. Sec'y of Hous. & Urban Dev., 56 F.3d 1243, 1250-51 (10th Cir.
1995); United States v. Marengo Cty. Comm'n, 731 F.2d 1546, 1559 n.20 (11th Cir.
1984).
141. See Am. Ins. Ass'n v. U.S. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., 74 F. Supp. 3d. 30
(D.D.C. 2014).
142. See City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179.
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may be litigated even in the absence of discriminatory intent. These
courts, therefore, recognize that "[e]ffect, not motivation, is the touch-
stone because a thoughtless housing practice can be as unfair to minority
rights as a willful scheme."'143 As a result of this ideology, federal courts
have interpreted the FHA as prohibiting unjustified practices with dis-
criminatory effects for over 40 years. 
144
Despite the nearly uniform acceptance of disparate impact theory,
federal judges have differed in their interpretations of how the theory
should be applied, and developed three distinct standards for proving a
disparate impact claim. First, the Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, and Tenth Cir-
cuit Courts of Appeals employed a balance-of-factors test.145 This stand-
ard requires courts to analyze and weigh the following considerations
when determining whether the plaintiff has established a case of discrim-
ination: "(1) the strength of plaintiff['s] showing of discriminatory im-
pact; (2) a quantum of evidence of discriminatory intent; (3) the defend-
ant's interest in the challenged conduct; and (4) whether the plaintiff
seeks affirmative relief or an injunction to restrain [the] defendant[] from
interfering with property owners who wish to provide housing."'146 A
plaintiff need not make a strong showing on all four factors.1
47
Second, the Third, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits developed a burden-
shifting analysis similar to the McDonnell-Douglas test used in employ-
ment discrimination cases. As discussed, this framework requires three
steps: (1) the plaintiff must first offer evidence of discriminatory con-
duct; (2) the defendant must then show a business justification for the act
or practice; and (3) the plaintiff must demonstrate that a reasonable non-
discriminatory alternative exists.148  The Third Circuit, however, has
modified this three-step framework to require the defendant o demon-
strate that no viable alternative exists in the third stage.
149
143. Michael G. Allen et al., Assessing HUD's Disparate Impact Rule: A Practition-
er's Perspective, 49 HARv. CR-CL L. REv. 155, 156 (2014) (alteration in original) (quot-
ing Smith v. Anchor Bldg. Corp., 536 F.2d 231, 233 (8th Cir. 1976)).
144. See Stacy E. Seicshnaydre, Is Disparate Impact Having Any Impact? An Appel-
late Analysis of Forty Years of Disparate Impact Claims Under the Fair Housing Act, 63
AM. U. L. REv. 357, 359 (2013).
145. See Town of Clarkton, 682 F.2d at 1065; Arthur, 782 F.2d at 575; Viii. of Ar-
lington Heights, 558 F.2d at 1290.
146. Bain, supra note 22, at 1446 n.83 (quoting Brief for Int'l Mun. Lawyers Ass'n
as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 2-4, Magner v. Gallagher, 132 S. Ct. 548
(2011) (No. 10-1032)).
147. See Keith v. Volpe, 858 F.2d 467, 483 (9th Cir. 1988) (explaining the balance-
of-factors test and citing Fourth and Seventh Circuit case law).
148. See Gilligan v. Jamco Dev. Corp., 108 F.3d 246, 249 (9th Cir. 1997); United
States v. City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179, 1187 (8th Cir. 1974).
149. See Resident Advisory Bd. v. Rizzo, 564 F.2d 126, 149 (3d Cir. 1977).
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Third, the First and Second Circuits employ a hybrid test, consisting
of four factors: (1) the plaintiff must present a prima facie case of dis-
parate impact discrimination; (2) the defendant must then demonstrate
that its actions furthered a governmental or business interest and no rea-
sonable non-discriminatory alternative existed; (3) the court should then
consider whether the plaintiff presented any evidence of discriminatory
intent; and (4) the court must finally determine whether the plaintiff
seeks an injunction or merely affirmative relief.150 Thus, while the courts
agree that disparate impact is a viable theory under the FHA, they are di-
vided over the proper test o evaluate a disparate impact claim.
In response to the conflicting judicial tests employed for disparate
impact lawsuits, HUD issued a proposed rule on November 16, 2011,
that interpreted the disparate impact standard in FHA cases and set forth
uniform parameters for evaluating FHA claims. This proposal was then
adopted as a final rule in February 2013, titled "Implementation of the
Fair Housing Act's Discriminatory Effects Standard."'15 Particularly, the
rule recognized the validity of disparate impact recovery and set forth the
respective burdens of proof to be applied. In doing so, HUD formalized
the burden-shifting mechanism used by a majority of circuit courts.
152
HUD, however, made clear that it was not espousing new law with the
final rule, but rather formalizing its long-held recognition of disparate
impact liability under the FHA. 153 As stated by HUD, the final rule "em-
bodies law that has been in place for almost four decades and that has
consistently been applied.., by HUD, the Justice Department and nine
other federal agencies, and federal courts."'54 Thus, both HUD and the
federal courts have recognized the availability of disparate impact under
the FHA for decades, resulting in a well-established precedent of curbing
housing discrimination on the basis of acts or practices that adversely af-
fect protected minorities.
150. See Huntington Branch, NAACP v. Town of Huntington, 844 F.2d 926, 936
(2d Cir. 1988), aff'd in part per curiam Town of Huntington v. Huntington Branch,
NAACP, 488 U.S. 15 (1988); see also Bain, supra note 22, at 1455.
151. 24 C.F.R. § 100.500 (2013). The Final Rule took effect on March 18, 2013.
Id.
152. Id.
153. Implementation of the Fair Housing Act's Discriminatory Effects Standard, 78
Fed. Reg. 11462 (Feb. 15, 2013) (implementing 24 C.F.R. § 100).
154. Id.
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III. THE D.C. DISTRICT COURT DEFIES GRAVITY: AN ANALYSIS OF
AMERICAN INSURANCE ASSOCIATION V. UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT
In direct contrast to the widely accepted use of disparate impact as a
viable legal theory of discrimination under the FHA, the United States
District Court for the District of Columbia issued a surprising opinion on
November 4, 2014, that declared disparate impact inapplicable under the
FHA. 155 Specifically, Judge Richard J. Leon relied heavily on the statu-
tory text of the FHA to conclude that Congress did not intend to prohibit
discriminatory effects under the FHA, but rather only barred actual dis-
criminatory conduct. This section summarizes the D.C. District Court's
opinion in American Insurance Association v. United States Department
of Housing and Urban Development, which created a split among federal
jurisdictions regarding the availability of disparate impact theory in the
financial services industry.
Following the promulgation of HUD's final rule, which expressed
acceptance of the disparate impact theory for FHA claims, plaintiffs
American Insurance Association and National Association of Mutual In-
surance Companies (collectively, "Plaintiffs") challenged HUD's rule as
a violation of the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA").156 Specifical-
ly, Plaintiffs alleged that HUD exceeded its statutory authority by im-
permissibly expanding the scope of the FHA to include disparate impact
claims.157 Plaintiffs filed a motion for summary judgment, and HUD
filed a motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, for summary judgment.1
58
After consideration of the parties' pleadings and the arguments of coun-
sel, the D.C. District Court agreed with Plaintiffs that the FHA prohibited
disparate treatment claims only, and thus ruled that HUD exceeded its
authority under the APA.159 Accordingly, the court granted summary
judgment in favor of Plaintiffs.
In agreeing with Plaintiffs' position, the court consulted well-
established administrative procedure principles. In Chevron, U S.A., Inc.
v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., the Supreme Court mandat-
ed judicial deference to agency constructions of their own statutes, pro-
vided such interpretations are reasonable. 160 The determination of
whether agency rules and statutory constructions should receive defer-
155. Am. Ins. Ass'n v. U.S. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev, 74 F. Supp. 3d 30
(D.D.C. 2014).
156. Id. at 31; 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559 (2012).
157. Am. Ins. Ass'n, 74 F. Supp. at 31.
158. Id. at 32.
159. Id.
160. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 844
(1984).
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ence is governed by a two-step test: (1) has Congress spoken on the pro-
vision at issue; and, if not, (2) is the agency's interpretation based on a
permissible construction of the statute?161 Where Congress has ex-
pressed an unambiguous intent through the statute's plain language, this
intent controls and inquiry into the second prong is impermissible. 162 If
Congress has not interpreted the provision at issue, however, it "has ex-
plicitly left a gap for the agency to fill" and "there is an express delega-
tion of authority to an agency" to interpret the provision. 163 In these cas-
es, agency interpretations of the statute must be afforded controlling
weight unless they are "manifestly contrary to the statute.,164 Thus, in
determining whether disparate impact claims are cognizable under the
FHA, the D.C. District Court first examined the text of the FHA to see if
it unambiguously evidenced Congress' intent to allow disparate impact
causes of action. 1
65
Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 3604, the following conduct is unlawful
under the FHA:
(a) To refuse to sell or rent after the making of a bona fide offer, or
to refuse to negotiate for the sale or rental of, or otherwise make una-
vailable or deny, a dwelling to any person because of race, color, re-
ligion, sex, familial status, or national origin.
(b) To discriminate against any person in the terms, conditions, or
privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of ser-
vices or facilities in connection therewith, because of race, color, re-
ligion, sex, familial status, or national origin.
(c) To make, print, or publish, or cause to be made, printed, or pub-
lished any notice, statement, or advertisement, with respect to the sale
or rental of a dwelling that indicates any preference, limitation, or
discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, handicap, familial
status, or national origin, or an intention to make any such preference,
limitation, or discrimination. 166
Within these prohibitions, the following operative verbs are discerned:
"refuse," "discriminate," and "make."'167 The plain meaning of "discrim-
inate," the relevant verb at hand, is "to make a difference in treatment or
favor on a class or categorical basis in disregard of individual merit.'
168
161. Id. at 842-43.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 843-44.
164. Id. at 844.
165. Am. Ins. Ass'n v. U.S. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., 74 F. Supp. 3d. 30, 39-
42 (D.D.C. 2014).
166.42 U.S.C. §§ 3604(a)-(c) (2012) (emphasis added).
167. Am. Ins. Ass'n, 74 F. Supp. 3d at 40.
168. Id. at 40-41.
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Nowhere within the definition of "discriminate" is reference made to the
effects of this difference in treatment.169 Thus, the express language of
the FHA prohibits only intentional discrimination (disparate treatment).
To further support this reasoning, the D.C. District Court concluded
that Congress knew how to prohibit disparate impact if it had so de-
sired.170 Specifically, the court referenced the discriminatory effects lan-
guage of Title VII and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of
1967 ("ADEA"), both of which include "key textual differences" from
the FHA's provisions prohibiting only disparate treatment.17 1 The strik-
ing contrast between the language of these three statutes, all of which
were enacted within a relatively close time frame, provides significant
evidence that Congress did not intend to prohibit disparate impact under
the FHA.1
7 1
Moreover, the FHA's statutory scheme solidified the D.C. District
Court's reasoning. In 1988, Congress amended the FHA but did not
make changes to the operative language of §§ 3604 and 3606.17 How-
ever two years later in 1990, Congress enacted the Americans with Disa-
bilities Act ("ADA"), which explicitly authorized disparate impact
claims upon a showing that a practice "adversely affects" a disabled em-
ployee.174 Less than a year later in 1991, Congress amended Title VII to
include similar language authorizing disparate impact claims. 175 The fact
that Congress consciously elected not to amend the FHA in 1988 to in-
clude effects-based language "clearly illustrates that it never intended for
claims of disparate impact to be cognizable under the FHA."'
176
In addition to examining the express language and historical statuto-
ry scheme of the FHA, the D.C. District Court next analyzed the practi-
cal implication of permitting disparate impact under the FHA. In par-
ticular, the court expressed great concern that recognizing disparate
impact theory in the context of the FHA would "run afoul" of the
McCarran-Ferguson Act, which ensures the primacy of state law in the
field of insurance regulation.17 7 Specifically, the McCarran-Ferguson
Act states that "[njo Act of Congress shall be construed to invalidate,
impair, or supersede any law enacted by any State for the purpose of reg-
ulating the business of insurance .. ,,78 Expanding the FHA to include
169. See id. at 40.
170. Id. at 41.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 42.
173. Id.
174.Id.
175. Id. at 43.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 43-44.
178. 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) (2012); Am. Ins. Ass'n., 74 F. Supp. at 44.
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disparate impact claims would produce a "wide-ranging disruptive ef-
fect" on the states' ability to regulate homeowners insurance pricing, and
would further require insurance agencies to collect and analyze race-
based data, which is expressly prohibited under state law.179 The McCar-
ran-Ferguson Act would thus reversely preempt the FHA and raise seri-
ous concerns about federal encroachment on state insurance regula-
tion.180  For these reasons, the court concluded that no reasonable
interpretation of the FHA could lead to the conclusion that Congress in-
tended to prohibit disparate impact.18
Finally, the district court briefly addressed the countervailing deci-
sions of the 11 Circuit Courts of Appeals. The court noted that these
contrary decisions were issued before the Supreme Court decided Smith
v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228 (2005)112 In Smith, the Court made
clear that the availability of disparate impact liability turns primarily-if
not exclusively-on the presence or absence of effects-based lan-
guage.183 No circuit court has recognized a claim for disparate impact
subsequent o the Supreme Court's decision in Smith; however, no court
has reconsidered its circuit's precedent in light of the Supreme Court's
holding.'84 Because the 11 Circuit Courts of Appeals issued their rulings
before Smith, their reasoning and subsequent holdings are outdated and
inapplicable to the present disparate impact framework. Thus, the D.C.
District Court concluded that disparate impact was not an available vehi-
cle for discrimination recovery under the FHA.1
85
IV. ONE WAY OR ANOTHER: SUPREME COURT REVIEW OF FAIR
HOUSING DISCRIMINATION
Although the D.C. District Court issued its opinion as recently as
November 2014, the Supreme Court has been attempting to resolve the
disparate impact question since 2012. The D.C. District Court's ruling is
just another minefield in the disparate impact landscape. Having failed
to address the applicability of disparate impact under the FHA twice, the
Supreme Court finally issued a ruling affirming its validity on June 25,
2015. This opinion clarifies the disparate impact doctrine in light of
American Insurance Association and resolves these conflicting judicial
opinions. This section analyzes the Supreme Court's prior attempts to
179. Am. Ins. Ass'n., 74 F. Supp. at44.
180. Id. at 44-45.
181. Id. 45-46.
182. Id. at 46.
183. Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 235-36 (2005).
184. Am. Ins. Ass'n., 74 F. Supp. at 46.
185. Id. at47.
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adjudicate disparate impact under the FHA and discusses the Court's
controversial affirmance of the disparate impact doctrine.
A. Don't Think Twice, It's All Right: Two Prior Attempts at Supreme
Court Review
The applicability of disparate impact under the FHA has successful-
ly eluded Supreme Court review for almost three years. While the Court
has twice before granted certiorari on this precise issue, the Obama Ad-
ministration and civil rights activists orchestrated behind the scenes set-
tlements to prevent actual adjudication of these claims.186 Both Magner
v. Gallagher87 and Township of Mount Holly v. Mt. Holly Gardens Citi-
zens in Action, Inc.' 88 were conveniently settled after the Supreme Court
granted the writ of certiorari but before oral argument could be held.
Thus, despite the Supreme Court's desire to clarify the disparate impact
doctrine, the opportunities to complete this objective remained unavaila-
ble until 2015.
1. The First Case: Magner v. Gallagher
The most controversial settlement coordinated by the Obama Ad-
ministration occurred in the case of Magner v. Gallagher in 2011. In
Magner, the City of St. Paul established the Department of Neighbor-
hood Housing and Property Improvement ("DNHPI") in 2002 to admin-
ister and enforce the housing code.189 The DNHPI director drafted pro-
cedural guidelines to keep the city clean and ensure all available housing
was habitable.'90 As part of its mission, the DNHPI was empowered to
inspect family dwellings to check compliance with applicable housing
codes.191 From 2002 to 2005, in particular, DNHPI director Andy Daw-
kins "increased the level of Housing Code enforcement targeted at rental
properties.'192 Mr. Dawkins enforced the Housing Code "to the max"
and sought to compel property owners to take responsibility for their
186. See Greg Stohr, Supreme Court to Hear 'Disparate Impact' Housing Case, INS.
J. (Oct. 3, 2014),
http://www.insurancejoumal.com/news/national/2014/10/03/342556.htm (explaining that
"President Barack Obama's administration and civil rights advocates have sought to steer
the issue away from the Supreme Court").
187. Gallagher v. Magner, 619 F.3d 823 (8th Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 132 S. Ct.
548 (2011).
188. Mt. Holly Gardens Citizens in Action, Inc. v. Twp. of Mt. Holly, 658 F.3d 375
(3d Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 2824 (2013).
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homes.193 To achieve this objective, DNHPI issued orders to correct con-
ditions, condemnations, fees for excessive services, tenant convictions,
revocations of rental registrations, and court actions. 1
94
The Magner appellants ("Appellants") owned or rented properties
that were subject to DNHPI enforcement and received between 10 and
25 code violations per property. 195 These violations included "rodent in-
festation, missing dead-bolt locks, inadequate sanitation facilities, inade-
quate heat, inoperable smoke detectors, broken or missing doors and
screens, and broken or missing guardrails or handrails."'196 As a result of
these code violations, Appellants were forced to endure increased
maintenance costs, pay for property improvements, and sell properties in
numerous instances.197 These rental property owners then brought suit
against the City of St. Paul to challenge the enforcement of the housing
code.'98 Specifically, Appellants argued that the city's enforcement ef-
forts resulted in making low-income housing unavailable through con-
demnations and forced sales.'99 As such, Appellants contended that the
purpose and effect of the enforcement mechanism was to put them out of
business.2 °°
The United States District Court for the District of Minnesota sided
with the City of St. Paul and held that the evidence "d[id] not support a
conclusion of racial animus toward African-Americans ... .,,201 The
Eighth Circuit disagreed and reversed the district court's dismissal of the
disparate impact claim.20 2 Importantly, however, the Eighth Circuit did
not enter final judgment on the merits in favor of Appellants. Rather, the
Eighth Circuit simply acknowledged that Appellants had satisfied their
burden of proving a prima facie case of discrimination, and allowed the
case to proceed to trial.203 Subsequently, the Eighth Circuit denied the
petition for rehearing en banc and by panel,204 and the Supreme Court
granted certiorari a year later.20 5
Faced with inevitable Supreme Court review, the Obama Admin-
istration and civil rights advocates engaged in desperate measures to pre-
clude elimination of the disparate impact theory. Calculatingly, just nine
193. Id.
194. Id.





200. Seicshnaydre, supra note 144, at 379.
201. Steinhauser v. City of St. Paul, 595 F. Supp. 2d 987, 1005 (D. Minn. 2008).
202. Magner, 619 F.3d at 845.
203. Id.
204. Gallagher v. Magner, 636 F.3d 380 (8th Cir. 2010).
205. Magner v. Gallagher, 132 S. Ct. 548 (2011).
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days after the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Magner, HUD issued
its proposed final rule to recognize disparate impact as a legitimate theo-
ry of discrimination under the FHA.2 °6 When HUD's rule failed to con-
clusively resolve the issue, however, newly minted Secretary of Labor
Thomas Perez flew to St. Paul to negotiate dismissal of the case.207 At
this point, briefs from both sides had already been filed with the Court
and oral argument was only weeks away.
To help force a settlement in Magner, Mr. Perez sought leverage to
stop the City of St. Paul from pressing its appeal and potentially destroy-
ing the "lynchpin" of civil rights enforcement,2 °8 During these negotia-
tions, Mr. Perez stumbled upon Fredrick Newell, a small-business owner
in St. Paul who filed a whistleblower lawsuit against the City in 2009.209
Mr. Newell alleged that he City of St. Paul received millions of dollars
in community development funds by improperly and illegally certifying
its compliance with federal law.210  After discussing this claim with
HUD, the U.S. Attorney's Office in Minnesota, and the Civil Fraud Sec-
tion within the Justice Department's Civil Division, Mr. Newell and his
attorneys believed the case could be worth as much as $200 million.211
The strength of this case led Mr. Newell to seek federal government in-
tervention to create a qui tam suit.
212
Unfortunately, Mr. Newell's suit never achieved fruition. In Febru-
ary 2012, Mr. Perez struck "a secret deal behind closed doors" with St.
Paul's Mayor, Christopher Coleman, and St. Paul's outside counsel, Da-
vid Lillehaug. In exchange for the City of St. Paul agreeing to a settle-
ment in Magner, Mr. Perez promised that the Department of Justice
would not intervene in Mr. Newell's False Claims Act qui tam complaint
pending against Minneapolis, Minnesota.213 In fact, Mr. Perez called
HUD's general counsel and asked her to reconsider HUD's support for
206. See Am. Ins. Ass'n v. U.S. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., 74 F. Supp. 3d 30, 33
(D.D.C. 2014).
207. See HOUSE COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT & GOV'T REFORM ET AL, 113TH CONG.,
DOJ's QUID PRO Quo WITH ST. PAUL: How ASSISTANT ArT'Y GEN. THOMAS PEREZ MA-
NIPULATED JUSTICE AND IGNORED THE RULE OF LAW 1 (2013),
http://oversight.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/DOJ-St-Paul.pdf [hereinafter
DOJ's QUID PRO Quo].
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id.; see also Burrus, supra note 6 ("Mr. Newell began to suspect the city had
falsely claimed to be in compliance with Section 3 [of the Housing and Urban Develop-
ment Act] for six years in order to get $62 million in federal aid.").
211. DOJ's QUID PRO QUO, supra note 207, at 1.
212. See Burrus, supra note 6 (explaining that "[i]n order for a qui tam suit to
work,.. . the government must support the citizen."). A qui tam lawsuit enables private
individuals to assist in the prosecution of cases and receive all or part of the recovery. See
United Seniors Ass'n, Inc. v. Phillip Morris USA, 500 F.3d 19, 24 (1st Cir. 2007).
213. DOJ's QUID PRO Quo, supra note 207, at 1.
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intervention in Mr. Newell's case.214 "The withdrawal of HUD's support
for Newell's case led to an erosion of support in the Civil Division" and
the Civil Division eventually declined to intervene in Mr. Newell's
case.215 Subsequently, the City of St. Paul withdrew its appeal in Mag-
ner two weeks before oral argument.
Despite this obvious quid pro quo to protect the disparate impact
doctrine, Mr. Perez and the Obama Administration undertook significant
measures to ensure that the exchange was not discovered. According to
the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, the Senate
Committee on the Judiciary, and the House Committee on the Judiciary,
Mr. Perez "attempted to cover up the true reasons behind the Justice De-
partment's decision to decline Fredrick Newell's case by asking career
attorneys to obfuscate the presence of Magner as a factor in the declina-
tion decision and by refraining from a written agreement.,216 In particu-
lar, Mr. Perez explicitly instructed the Civil Division Section Chief in the
U.S. Attorney's Office in Minnesota to eliminate any mention of the
Magner case in the declination memo that would be distributed to the
Civil Division.217 Mr. Perez avoided written agreements in connection
with the exchange that settled two cases potentially worth millions of
dollars and instead insisted that your "word was your bond.,218 Taken
with additional circumstantial evidence, the legislative committees con-
cluded that Mr. Perez and the Obama Administration impermissibly and
unethically undermined the administration of justice in two cases and
cost American taxpayers the opportunity to recover up to $200 million
from Mr. Newell's lawsuit.219 In this manner, the Obama Administration
narrowly avoided Supreme Court review on the disparate impact doc-
trine.
2. The Second Case: Mt. Holly Gardens Citizens in Action, Inc. v.
Twp. of Mt. Holly
Shortly after Magner, the Supreme Court received a second oppor-
tunity to review and adjudicate disparate impact heory under the FHA.
The case of Mt. Holly Gardens Citizens in Action, Inc. v. Twp. of Mt.
Holly presented more sympathetic facts and plaintiffs, but still raised the
critical question of disparate impact's scope. In this case, Mount Holly
Township, located in Burlington County, New Jersey, proposed a rede-
214. Id.
215. Id. at 1-2.
216. Id. at2.
217. Id. at 42.
218. Id. at 45.
219. See id. at 64.
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velopment plan to eliminate homes in its Gardens neighborhood, which
was occupied primarily by low-income residents.220 Almost all residents
of the Gardens neighborhood earned less than 80 percent of the area's
median income.221 The Township proposed replacing these low-income
houses with significantly more expensive housing units. At each stage of
the redevelopment process, the Gardens' residents objected and ex-
pressed fear that they would be displaced and unable to afford housing
elsewhere in the community.222 The Township, however, ignored these
complaints and hired Keating Urban Partners, LLC, to develop a reloca-
tion plan for all displaced residents.223 Although the Township offered to
purchase existing homes for between $32,000 and $49,000, the expected
cost of a new home after the redevelopment was between $200,000 and
$275,000.224
In May 2008, the residents filed suit in the United States District
Court for the District of New Jersey, alleging violation of the FHA based
on the theory of disparate impact. The district court rejected this claim
and granted summary judgment in favor of the Township, holding that no
prima facie case of discrimination had been established.225 The residents
timely appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Cir-
cuit, which vacated the district court's grant of summary judgment and
remanded the case for further proceedings and factual development.226
The Supreme Court granted certiorari on June 17, 2013.227
Similar to Magner, the Obama Administration and civil rights ad-
vocates sought to halt Supreme Court review of the disparate impact doc-
trine. Importantly, the final rule HUD proposed during Magner was
adopted and implemented between the filing and granting of the Mount
Holly certiorari petition.228 This governmental action, however, failed to
spark settlement negotiations between the parties. As a result, Mount
220. Mt. Holly Gardens Citizens in Action, Inc. v. Twp. of Mt. Holly, 658 F.3d 375,
377 (3d Cir. 2011).
221. Id. at 378.
222. Id. at 379.
223. Id.
224. Id. at 380.
225. Id. at 381.
226. Id. at 387-88.
227. Twp. of Mt. Holly v. Mt. Holly Gardens Citizens in Action, Inc., 133 S. Ct.
2824 (2013).
228. Allen et al., supra note 143, at 158 ("Four months before the grant of certiorari,
HUD promulgated a final rule, 'Implementation of the Fair Housing Act's Discriminatory
Effects Standard,' ... in which HUD 'formalize[d] its long-held recognition of discrimi-
natory effects liability under the Act .... "); Seicshnaydre, supra note 144, at 403 ("On
February 15, 2013, after the Mount Holly petition was filed, but before it was granted,
HUD issued its Final Rule, entitled 'Implementation of the Fair Housing Act's Discrimi-
natory Effects Standard."').
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Holly, the Ford Foundation, George Soros' Open Society Foundations,
the National Fair Housing Alliance, and Self Help Community Devel-
opment-all housing allies of the Obama Administration--contributed
money to foster negotiations in an effort to help the parties find common
ground.229 On the opposite side, representatives from the banking and
financial services industry "offered [monetary] incentives to the
[T]own[ship] to continue litigation rather than settle.'230 The Township,
however, rebuffed the offer and entered into an eleventh-hour settlement
with the residents.23' While "Republicans accused the Justice Depart-
ment of seeking to intervene again with the Mount Holly case," the
Township "said that the feds had nothing to do with the settlement," but
rather attributed the successful negotiations to a change in political lead-
ership.232 Thus, the Mount Holly case became the second case in two
years that the Supreme Court lost its ability to conclusively adjudicate
fair housing discrimination claims.
B. Three Is the Magic Number: The Supreme Court Finally Tackles
Disparate Impact
Despite the Supreme Court's failed attempts to address FHA dispar-
ate impact claims in Magner and Mount Holly, the Court received its
third opportunity to tackle the disparate impact question when it granted
certiorari in Texas Department of Housing and Community Affairs v. In-
clusive Communities Project on October 2, 2014.233 In this case, the
State of Texas sought to overturn a Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals deci-
sion ordering it to more evenly allocate affordable housing subsidies be-
tween black and white neighborhoods in Dallas. 4 Specifically, the In-
clusive Communities Project ("ICP"), which operates as a non-profit
Texas organization seeking racial and socio-economic integration in the
Dallas area, challenged the Texas Department of Housing and Communi-
229. Rigging Antidiscrimination Law, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 18, 2013, 6:46 PM),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702304243904579198144114654908; see
also Daniel Fisher, Supreme Court Once Again Takes Challenge to Disparate-Impact
Claims, FORBES (Oct. 3, 2014, 12:15 PM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/danielfisher/20 14/10/03/supreme-court-once-again-takes-
challenge-to-disparate-impact-claims/.
230. Adam Serwer, Mount Holly Settlement Spares Fair Housing Act-For Now,




233. Tex. Dep't of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S.
Ct. 46 (2014).
234. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc. v. Tex. Dep't of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs, 747
F.3d 275, 278 (5th Cir. 2014).
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ty Affairs' distribution of tax credits.235 The ICP assists African Ameri-
cans in finding affordable housing through the use of subsidies, which
take the form of vouchers.236 While private landlords may decline the
vouchers, landlords receiving federal tax credits for low-income housing
are required to accept the subsidy.237 The Texas Department of Housing
and Community Affairs, in turn, decides where to apply the tax credits
and thus implicitly alters the housing options available to low-income
families.23 8
In March 2008, the ICP filed suit against the Texas Department of
Housing and Community Affairs in the United States District Court for
the Northern District of Texas, alleging that its distribution of tax credits
violated the FHA and the Fourteenth Amendment.239 In particular, the
ICP claimed that the Texas Department of Housing and Community Af-
fairs applied the tax credits in a racially segregated manner by dispropor-
tionately granting housing credits in minority neighborhoods.240  The
Northern District of Texas agreed and found that the tax credit had a dis-
parate impact on minorities. The United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit agreed that he disparate-impact claim was cognizable, but
remanded the case on the merits, and the Supreme Court granted the writ
for certiorari on October 2, 2014.241 Oral argument in the case was held
on January 21, 2015, and the Court issued its decision affirming dispar-
ate impact on June 25, 2015.242
1. Stayin' Alive: The Majority Saves Disparate Impact Liability
under the FHA
In an unexpected blow to financial institutions nationwide, a deeply
divided Supreme Court affirmed the viability of disparate impact claims
243under the FHA. Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority that includ-
ed Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan, handed civil rights
activists an unquestionable victory when it ruled that racial discrimina-
tion claims in the housing context are not "limited by questions of in-
tent.' '244 Specifically, the 5-4 ruling expressly authorizes discrimination
235. Id. at 277.
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. See id. at 277-78.
239. Id. at 278.
240. Id.
241. Tex. Dep't of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S.
Ct. 46 (2014).
242. Tex. Dep 't ofHous. & Cmty. Affairs, 135 S. Ct. at 2507.
243. See id. at 2526.
244. See Bill Chappell, In Fair Housing Act Case, Supreme Court Backs 'Disparate
Impact' Claims, NPR (June 25, 2015, 12:26 PM), http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-
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claims based upon statistics and circumstantial evidence that illustrate a
discriminatory effect on certain minority groups, even if the lending insti-
tution possessed no discriminatory intent.245 This section offers a suc-
cinct overview of the Supreme Court's holding and explains why the ma-
jority's opinion is fatally flawed through an in-depth analysis of Justice
Alito's dissent.
The precise question presented for the Court's determination was
whether disparate impact theory is a cognizable vehicle for recovery un-
der the FRA.246 Answering this question in the affirmative, the majority
divided its analysis into four primary categories: (1) statutory language;
(2) congressional FHA amendments and appellate precedent; (3) legisla-
tive purpose; and (4) disparate impact limitations.
i. Statutory Language
In no uncertain terms, the majority concluded that the plain lan-
guage of the FHA recognizes disparate impact liability. In particular, the
Court focused a substantial portion of its analysis on the statutory phrase
"otherwise make unavailable," and analogized this language to two
seemingly similar anti-discrimination statutes: Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act.
Looking first at § 703(a) of Title VII, the Court reiterated its holding in
Griggs v. Duke Power Co.247 that disparate impact liability supported the
purpose and design of Title VII. 248 While the Court did not examine §
703 in full, it relied principally on the phrase "otherwise adversely af-
fect" in § 703(a)(2), which provides:
It shall be an unlawful employer practice for an employer... (2) to
limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment
in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of
employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an
employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or na-
tional origin.249
In interpreting this provision, the Court explained that the "other-
wise adversely affect" language was designed to combat the consequenc-
es of discriminatory employment practices, not simply discriminatory in-




246. Tex. Dep 't ofHous. & Cmty. Affairs, 135 S. Ct. at 2513.
247. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
248. Tex. Dep 't ofHous. & Cmty. Affairs, 135 S. Ct. at 2517.
249. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2012) (emphasis added).
250. Tex. Dep 't ofHous. & Cmty. Affairs,135 S. Ct. at 2519.
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the congressional purpose of the statute, which included removing dis-
criminatory barriers to equal employment.251  However, although the
Court recognized the applicability of disparate impact in the employment
context, it limited its holding by imposing a business necessity de-
fense.252
Next, the Court turned to § 4(a) of the ADEA, which comparably
states: "[i]t shall be unlawful for an employer ... (2) to limit, segregate,
or classify his employees in any way which would deprive or tend to de-
prive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely
affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's age.' 253 In
2005, the Court in Smith v. City of Jackson addressed whether this provi-
sion allowed disparate impact claims, with a plurality concluding that the
same reasoning used in Griggs was applicable to the ADEA 4 The plu-
rality emphasized that the "adversely affect" language encompassed the
discriminatory effects of an action, not merely discriminatory intent. 5
Thus, the Court concluded that Griggs and Smith stand for the proposi-
tion that "antidiscrimination laws must be construed to encompass dis-
parate-impact claims when their text refers to the consequences of ac-
tions ... and where that interpretation is consistent with statutory
purpose. 2 56
Analogizing these statutory provisions to the FHA, the Court ex-
plained that the FHA's "otherwise make unavailable" language encom-
passes disparate impact claims.257 Specifically, the Court found no prac-
tical difference between the phrases "otherwise make unavailable" and
"otherwise adversely affect" that would preclude disparate impact recov-
ery.258 Instead, the Court determined that "otherwise make unavailable"
refers directly to the consequences of an action, rather than an actor's
discriminatory intent.259 In fact, the Court went so far as to label this
phrase "results-oriented.
260
251. Id. at 2521.
252. Id. at 2517.
253. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(2) (2012) (emphasis added).
254. Tex. Dep't of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs, 135 S. Ct. at 2517; see Smith v. City of
Jackson, 544 U.S. 228 (2005).
255. Smith, 544 U.S. at 236.
256. Tex. Dep 't of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs, 135 S. Ct. at 2518.
257. 1d.
258. Id. at 2519 ("Title VII's and the ADEA's 'otherwise adversely affect' language
is equivalent in function and purpose to the FHA's 'otherwise make unavailable' lan-
guage. In these three statutes the operative text looks to results. The relevant statutory
phrases, moreover, play an identical role in the structure common to all three statutes:
Located at the end of lengthy sentences that begin with prohibitions on disparate treat-
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Additionally, the Court placed significant weight on the location of
this language in the FHA's statutory text.261 Similar to the "otherwise
adversely affect" phrase in Title VII and the ADEA, the FHA's "other-
wise make unavailable" language is located at the end of a lengthy sen-
tence that begins with a prohibition on disparate treatment.262 As such,
the Court determined that this language served as a catchall phrase that
referred to an action's effects, not the defendant's intent.263
Finally, in further support of its textual language analysis, the Court
contended that it construed similar statutory language in a 1979 case,
Board of Education of City School District of New York v. Harris,
2 64
when it held that the term "discriminat[e]" included disparate impact lia-
bility.265 For these reasons, the Court concluded that the FHA expressly
authorizes disparate impact actions.
ii. Congressional FHA Amendments and Appellate Precedent
To supplement its plain language analysis, the Court further sup-
ported its holding by examining the congressional FHA amendments and
appellate precedent.2 66 As previously discussed, Congress expanded the
reach of the FHA in 1988 with the Fair Housing Amendments Act,
which banned discrimination on the basis of familial status and disabil-
ity. 267 At the time Congress enacted these amendments, nine circuit
courts of appeals had determined that the FHA encompassed isparate
impact claims.268 Congress, therefore, must have been aware of this
unanimous precedent when it revised the scope of the FHA.269 The
Court placed particular emphasis on the fact that Congress amended the
FHA in light of this appellate precedent without altering the operative
language of §§ 804(a) and 805(a).270 Accordingly, Congress' decision to
amend the FHA without contradicting these judicial holdings "is con-
vincing support for the conclusion that Congress accepted and ratified






264. Bd. of Educ. of City Sch. Dist. of New York v. Harris, 444 U.S. 130, 140-41
(1979).
265. Tex. Dep'tofHous. & Cmty. Affairs, 135 S. Ct. at 2518-19.
266. Id. at 2519.
267. Id. at 2520.
268. Id. at 2519.
269. Id.
270. Id. at 2520.
271. Id.
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Furthermore, the Court noted that the Fair Housing Amendments
Act included three exemptions from disparate impact liability. First, the
FHA does not prohibit an appraiser from taking into account factors oth-
er than race, religion, national origin, sex, or familial status.272 Second,
the FHA does not prohibit adverse conduct against an applicant who has
been convicted of illegally manufacturing or distributing controlled sub-
stances.273 Finally, Congress explained that the FHA does not prohibit
the housing industry from applying reasonable restrictions regarding the
maximum number of occupants for a dwelling.274 These exclusions, ac-
cording to the Court, would have been unnecessary if Congress had in-
tended that the FHA apply solely to disparate treatment claims.275 In
fact, the exclusions would not even make sense unless disparate impact
claims had been contemplated by Congress.2 76 Thus, Congress' failure to
explicitly ban disparate impact liability in light of these nine circuit
courts of appeals' rulings and the FHA amendments, results in an implic-
it acceptance of these judicial holdings. 7
iii. Legislative Purpose
Next, the majority analyzed the FHA's legislative purpose and con-
cluded that disparate impact liability furthers the congressional goal of
eliminating discrimination in the housing market. Over the past several
decades, courts and administrative agencies have used disparate impact
liability to vindicate the FHA's objectives and stop the enforcement of
arbitrary and discriminatory ordinances, housing policies, and financial
27lending practices.27 Not only have these actions addressed indirect dis-
crimination, but they have also played a direct role in uncovering overt
discriminatory intent. Pursuant to the Court's reasoning, disparate im-
pact claims permit "plaintiffs to counteract unconscious prejudices and
disguised animus that escape easy classification as disparate treat-
ment. 2 79 Thus, the Court maintains that disparate impact liability is a
272. Id.; see 42 U.S.C. § 3605(c) (2012).
273. Tex. Dep't of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs, 135 S. Ct. at 2520; see 42 U.S.C. §
3607(b)(4).
274. Tex. Dep't of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs, 135 S. Ct. at 2520; see 42 U.S.C. §
3607(b)(1).
275. Tex. Dept ofHous. & Cmty. Affairs, 135 S. Ct. at 2520.
276. Id. at 2520-21.
277. See id.
278. Id. at 2522; see, e.g., Town of Huntington. v. Huntington Branch, NAACP, 488
U.S. 15, 16-18 (1988) (invalidating zoning laws that prohibited the construction of multi-
family rental units); Greater New Orleans Fair Hous. Action Ctr. v. St. Bernard Par., 641
F. Supp. 2d 563, 569 (E.D. La. 2009) (invalidating discriminatory post-Hurricane Katrina
ordinances).
279. Tex. Dep"t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs, 135 S. Ct. at 2520.
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vehicle for preventing segregated housing patterns that might result from
unconscious stereotyping, and furthers the FHA's primary legislative ob-
jective.28 °
iv. Disparate Impact Limitations
Although the Court upheld the use of disparate impact under the
FHA, it imposed what some consider "significant limitations" on the
practical application of the doctrine.28' Analogizing the limitations of the
FHA's disparate impact theory to the business necessity standard under
Title VII, the Court held that a racial imbalance, without more, is insuffi-
cient to sustain a discrimination claim.82 Rather, a plaintiff must identi-
fy a particular practice or policy that supports the alleged discriminatory
outcome. This "robust causality" requirement allegedly protects lenders
and housing institutions from liability for racial disparities they did not
create. 283 Without this limitation, governmental and private housing enti-
ties may impose numerical quotas that exacerbate the racial divide.284
Moreover, the Court emphasized that lower tribunals must "exam-
ine with care whether a plaintiff has made out a prima facie case of dis-
parate impact" and strive towards a "prompt resolution" of the case.285 If
a plaintiff cannot provide sufficient facts and evidence demonstrating a
causal connection between the harm suffered and the defendant's poli-
cies and procedures, the case should be dismissed at an early stage in the
litigation.286 This instruction seeks to protect lenders and housing agen-
cies from frivolous disparate impact suits. Moreover, an influx of merit-
less disparate impact claims may cause lenders and developers to refuse
to construct or renovate housing units for low-income families, thus un-
dermining the FHA's fundamental purpose and the free-market system at
the same time.287 Therefore, while the Court supports the application of
disparate impact o FHA claims, the judiciary "should avoid interpreting
disparate-impact liability to be so expansive as to inject racial considera-
tions into every housing decision.288
280. Id.
281. See Paul Hancock & Andrew C. Glass, Symposium: The Supreme Court Rec-
ognizes But Limits Disparate Impact in its Fair Housing Act Decision, SCOTUSBLOG
(June 26, 2015, 8:58 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2015/06/paul-hancock-fha/.





287. Id. at 2523-24.
288. Id. at 2524.
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Finally, the Court noted that remedial orders for disparate impact
claims must be consistent with the Constitution.289 In achieving this
mandate, orders granting relief should concentrate specifically on elimi-
nating the offending practice through race-neutral means.290 Remedial
orders that focus on racial targets or quotas may "raise more difficult
constitutional questions" and should be avoided when possible.29'
2. Disparate Impact Should Have Gone "Bye Bye Bye": Justice
Alito Explains Why the Majority Got It Wrong
In contrast to the Court's majority, Justices Alito, Roberts, Scalia,
and Thomas dissented from the judgment that disparate impact is viable
under the FHA. Arguing that the ruling creates impermissible legal lia-
bility unintended by the FHA, the dissent structured its analysis around
six core categories similar to those embraced by the majority: (1) statu-
tory language; (2) legislative intent; (3) congressional FRA amendments
and appellate precedent; (4) deference to HUD: (5) violation of Supreme
Court precedent; and (6) ramifications of the majority's opinion.292 In
addressing these six divisions, the dissent aptly explained that the majori-
ty misconstrued the plain text, legislative history, and congressional pur-
pose in an activist manner to placate "ambitious federal bureaucrats.2 93
This decision, according to the dissent, "is a serious mistake.
' 294
i. Statutory Language Does Not Support Disparate Impact
The dissent first took issue with the majority's focus on the phrase
"otherwise make unavailable." While the majority viewed this is the op-
erative focus of the statute, the dissent argued that the key phrase is "be-
cause of. '29 The link between the prohibited actions in the statute and
the protected characteristics is the conjoining phrase "because of," not
"otherwise make unavailable.296 Two terms ago, the Court explained




292. Id. at 2526 (Thomas, J., dissenting); id. at 2532 (Alito, J., dissenting).
293. John Fund, The Supreme Court's Disparate-Impact Decision is a Disaster,
NAT'L REv. (June 26, 2015, 4:00 AM),
http://www.nationalreview.com/article/420339/supreme-courts-disparate-impact-
decision-disaster-john-fund.
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count of."2 97 Thus, an individual acts "because of' a particular motiva-
298tion if that was the reason the person decided to act.
Expanding this concept to the FHA itself, the dissent stated that the
protected characteristic must be the motivating factor for causing a lend-
ing or housing institution to discriminate. According to Justice Alito:
Without torturing the English language, the meaning of these provi-
sions of the FHA cannot be denied. They make it unlawful to engage
in any covered actions "because of'-meaning "by reason of' or "on
account of," . . .- race, religion, etc. Put another way, the terms [af-
ter] the 'because of' clauses in the FHA supply the prohibited moti-
vations for the intentional acts . .. that the Act makes unlawful ....
Congress accordingly outlawed the covered actions only when they
are motivated by race or one of the other protected characteristics.
299
Merely treating a person less favorably because of a protected trait
does not implicate adverse effects, but rather includes a mens rea element
that cannot be ignored. Therefore, the phrase "because of' signifies that
intent to discriminate is required to sustain an FHA claim.
The dissent next specifically refuted the Court's conclusion that the
phrase "make unavailable" includes actions that result in discriminatory
effects. Pursuant to ordinary English usage, "otherwise make unavaila-
ble" must be viewed in conjunction with the preceding statutory text in §
804(a).300 The verbs in the statutory provision include "refuse," "deny,"
and "make unavailable. 30'1 Because the statute contains a list of related
actions, the Court must avoid supplying a word with a meaning so broad
that it is inconsistent with the remainder of the list.30 2 Given that the
words "refuse" and "deny" describe intentional actions, the phrase "oth-
erwise make unavailable" must be similarly limited to intentional con-
duct. It is impermissible to twist the FHA's language to authorize dis-
parate impact claims.30 3
ii. Congress Only Sought to Eliminate Intentional Discrimination
Shifting from a plain language analysis to legislative intent, Justice
Alito determined that the congressional purpose of the FHA was solely
to eliminate intentional discrimination.30 4 The concept of disparate im-
297. Id.
298. Id. at 2534 ("When English speakers say that someone did something 'because
of a factor, what they mean is that the factor was a reason for what was done.").
299. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (citation omitted).
300. Id.
301. Id.
302. Id. at 2536.
303. Id. at 2537.
304. Id.
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pact liability was "quite novel" in 1968 and likely not contemplated by
the legislature.30 5 It is, in fact, "anachronistic to think that Congress au-
thorized disparate-impact claims in 1968 but packaged that striking in-
novation so imperceptibly in the FHA's text."30 6 Rather, the "because
of' language employed by Congress in the statute suggests that Congress
sought solely to end intentional housing discrimination, not to mitigate
the discriminatory effects of racially neutral policies. According to Jus-
tice Alito, the majority has no right to question the means through which
Congress accomplishes its objectives, nor can it expand the reach of the
statute to target unintentional discriminatory outcomes.
iii. Silence is Not Consent: Congress Did Not Adopt Judicial
Precedent
The dissent next dispelled the majority's misconception that con-
gressional silence in light of judicial affirmation of disparate impact
claims constitutes ratification of that position. First, the majority's posi-
tion erroneously assumes that Congress "must have known about the ju-
diciary's interpretation of the FHA. 3 °7 Although nine Circuit Courts of
Appeals had addressed the disparate impact question by 1988, the Su-
preme Court had not yet confronted the issue and had not provided guid-
ance to Congress on the interpretation of the FHA.308 The majority,
however, tasks Congress with reviewing and analyzing lower court opin-
ions from throughout the United States to determine how its own statute
should be construed.
Furthermore, the United States formally took the position that the
FHA prohibits only intentional discrimination shortly before Congress
adopted the 1988 amendments. The United States had taken this position
for years in the lower courts, and had remained consistent with this ap-
proach through the 1988 amendments. This was even the position Presi-
dent Reagan held when he signed the FHA amendments into law.30 9 It is
therefore implausible and irreconcilable that Congress would be aware of
lower court rulings on the disparate impact doctrine but simultaneously
oblivious to the formal U.S. public view that those decisions were incor-
rect.310
Moreover, if Congress wished to change the plain meaning of the
FHA to encompass discriminatory effects, it must pass an amendment o
305. Id.
306. Id.
307. Id. at 2538.
308. Id.
309. Id. at 2540.
310. Id. at 2540-41.
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the legislation.311 The Court has rejected arguments concerning implicit
ratification in similar cases, noting particularly:
It does not follow that Congress' failure to overturn a statutory prec-
edent is reason for this Court to adhere to it. It is impossible to assert
with any degree of assurance that congressional failure to act repre-
sents affirmative congressional approval of the courts' statutory in-
terpretation. Congress may legislate, moreover, only through the pas-
sage of a bill which is approved by both Houses and signed by the
President. Congressional inaction cannot amend a duly enacted stat-
ute.
312
The majority, however, ignores this principle and its supporting
cases without explanation.
313
Additionally, the 1988 FHA amendments did not modify the opera-
tive language or meaning of §§ 804(a) and 805(a). While the amend-
ments did create three exceptions to liability, "[t]hese provisions neither
authorize nor bar disparate-impact claims [.],, 314 Rather, these amend-
ments offer enhanced protection for specific categories of persons and
entities engaging in certain behavior under the FHA. Thus, the 1988
amendments in no way addressed or approved the doctrine of disparate
impact.315
iv. HUD's Disparate Impact Rule Does Not Warrant Deference
In another line of attack, the dissent obliterated the Solicitor Gen-
eral's argument that the FHA is sufficiently ambiguous to warrant defer-
ence to HUD's FHA disparate impact rule. Although the dissent main-
tained that the FHA provisions at issue were unambiguous, it assumed
such ambiguity existed for the sake of argument. In rejecting the Solici-
tor General's contention, the dissent expressed its valid concern that
HUD's rule did not reflect a "fair and considered judgment on the matter
in question. 0 16 Rather, HUD first promulgated its disparate impact rule
43 years after the FHA's enactment and nine days after the Court granted
certiorari in Magner.3 17 Following Magner, the Court requested a brief
from the Solicitor General in Township of Mount Holly. Although HUD
took no immediate action to finalize its rule after Magner settled, it con-
311. Id. at 2540.
312. Id. (quoting Cent. Bank, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 186
(1994)) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citations omitted).
313. Id.
314. Id. at 2541.
315. Id.
316. Id. at 2542 (quoting Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 132 S. Ct.
2156, 2166 (2012) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
317. Id. at 2542-43.
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veniently adopted the disparate impact regulation immediately before the
Solicitor General's brief in Township of Mount Holly was due.318 Given
the unexpected settlement in both Magner and Mount Holly, and the sus-
picious timing of HUD's disparate impact rule, the dissent found defer-
ence to HUD to be unwarranted.
v. Expanding Disparate Impact to the FHA Contravenes Supreme
Court Precedent
Furthermore, Justice Alito's dissent criticized the majority's opinion
for placing too much emphasis on Griggs at the expense of Smith. The
Smith Court explained that the availability of disparate impact depends
on the presence of statutory language that "has no parallel in the
FHA. 319 Specifically, the Court in Smith analyzed a provision of the
ADEA with similar statutory language as the FHA and concluded unan-
imously that it did not authorize disparate impact liability.32° The majori-
ty, however, ignored Smith and instead concentrated on Griggs, which
analyzed a statutory provision readily distinguishable from the FHA.
The Court in Griggs looked primarily to the overall "objective" of Title
VII in concluding that disparate impact liability was warranted, and did
not provide a particularly clear textual reason for its conclusion.321 Low-
er courts following the Griggs decision "often made little effort to
ground their decisions in the statutory text.,322 This is an error the ma-
jority repeated in its opinion without care, placing more emphasis on the
FHA's purpose and mangling the text to support its position. Not only
that, but the majority also improperly expanded the analysis in Griggs to
establish a broad acceptance of disparate impact applying to all anti-
discrimination statutes. In this manner, the majority ignored a preceden-
tial opinion directly on point in favor of an inapplicable decision that was
never intended to apply to anti-discrimination statutes outside the em-
323ployment context.
vi. Unfortunate Consequences
In addition to powerfully articulating the undeniable pitfalls of the
majority's opinion, Justice Alito's dissent expressed further concern at
the practical consequences disparate impact could produce in the housing
context. In particular, "[d]isparate impact puts housing authorities in a
318. Id. at 2543.
319. Id.
320. Id.
321. Id. at 2544.
322. Id.
323. Id. at 2544-45.
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very difficult position because programs that are designed and imple-
mented to help the poor can provide the grounds for a disparate impact
claim.' ' 24 As illustrated in Magner, even a city's good faith and racially
neutral attempt to improve housing conditions can be perceived as dis-
criminatory.325 These claims can extend further and directly threaten tax,
welfare, regulatory, and licensing statutes.326 Moreover, this form of lia-
bility alters the power structure of discrimination claims and provides
borrowers with significantly increased leverage to force lenders and
housing agencies to settle meritless disputes.32' Thus, the majority's ac-
tivism will undoubtedly create a cascading series of unfortunate events
for lending institutions and housing agencies. The scope of the disaster is
all that remains unknown. For these reasons, Justice Alito's dissent
rightfully disagreed with the majority's activist opinion and succinctly
exposed the fatal flaws in the majority's reasoning.
3. We Took the Wrong Step Years Ago: Justice Thomas' Dissent
Justice Thomas, although joining Justice Alito's poignant dissent in
full, wrote separately to express his disagreement with Griggs and Smith,
and to advocate substantially limiting their application to the employ-
ment context. Arguing that Griggs is "made of sand," Justice Thomas
criticized the decision for upholding agency interpretation over congres-
sional enactment, and refused to "amplify its error. 32 8 In Justice Thom-
as' view, the doctrine of disparate impact has been impermissibly im-
ported into the Title VII and FHA statutes without clear statutory
authorization and intent. For this reason, Justice Thomas began his dis-
sent with the mandate that the Court "drop the pretense that Griggs' in-
terpretation of Title VII was legitimate.329
According to Justice Thomas, the mere fact that the phrase "other-
wise adversely affect" appears in § 703(a)(2) does not detract from the
congressional requirement of discriminatory intent.330 Rather, the pre-
ceding phrase "because of' means that a discriminatory action must be
taken "by reason of' or "on account of' a particular protected trait.
3 31
Accepting Griggs' interpretation of Title VII to include disparate impact
claims deletes the entire § 703(a)(2) requirement that an employer may
not discriminate "because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex,
324. Id. at 2548.
325. Id.
326. Id.
327. Id. at 2549-50.
328. Id. at 2526 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
329. Id.
330. Id. at 2527.
331. Id.
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or national origin., 332 Thus, under a plain reading of Title VII, there is
no question that Congress did not permit disparate impact claims in §
703(a)(2).
Instead, Title VII's disparate impact authorization originated from
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"). The EEOC
determined that discrimination had become more institutionalized and
less overt, and thus sought to prohibit race-neutral actions that produced
discriminatory effects.333 The Griggs Court then embraced this interpre-
tation by affording the EEOC's position significant deference and ac-
knowledging disparate impact worked to achieve the perceived purpose
of Title VII. 33 4 However, only plainly written statutory provisions go
through the process of bicameralism, not statutory purpose. The Court
should, therefore, not "transfer [its] responsibility for interpreting those
provisions to administrative agencies," particularly when the administra-
tive agency lacks substantive rulemaking authority.335
In addition to his disagreement over Griggs, Justice Thomas con-
cluded that the Court's opinion in Smith was similarly "incorrect" and
"regrettable.336  Because disparate impact liability had no foundation
under Title VII, it would be illogical to conclude that Congress supplied
the ADEA with disparate impact recovery four years before recognizing
the doctrine under Title VII. 3 37 For these reasons, Justice Thomas pro-
posed limiting disparate impact to the employment context, and not im-
properly importing the doctrine into statutes that were passed years be-
fore the Court decided Griggs. The majority's mistake of expanding
disparate impact to the F1HA will undoubtedly "take its toll.
338
V. WRECKING BALL: WHAT THE SUPREME COURT'S HOLDING MEANS
FOR THE FUTURE OF THE FINANCIAL SERVICES INDUSTRY
For the reasons discussed in Justice Alito's scathing dissent, the
disparate impact doctrine should never have been approved for use in
conjunction with the FHA. Not only does disparate impact lack any tex-
tual foundation in §§ 804 and 805, but it also contains no parallel lan-
guage to § 703(a) that warrants use of the Griggs analysis. The majority
should have abided by its decision in Smith, which prohibits disparate
impact liability unless expressly provided for in the statutory text. In-
332. Id. at 2527-28.
333. Id. at 2528.
334. Id. at 2529; see Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424,433-34 (1971).
335. Tex. Dep 't of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs, 135 S. Ct. at 2529 (Thomas, J., dissent-
ing).
336. Id. at 2531.
337. Id.
338. Id. at 2533.
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stead of interpreting the law as written, the majority improperly injected
its activist beliefs into the case and essentially re-wrote substantive pro-
visions of the FHA. The ramifications of this activism, however, will not
fall on the Supreme Court. Rather, the financial services industry will
shoulder the burden of this decision.
A. Money, Money, Money: Implications of Disparate Impact on Lenders
in FHA Cases
Although the Supreme Court arguably limited the application of
disparate impact under the FHIA to cases in which plaintiffs can prove
"robust causation," the practical reality is that mortgage lenders and fi-
nancial institutions are now exposed to vast liability for discrimination-
even when there is no animus or discriminatory motive. The major con-
sequence of the Court's ruling is that plaintiffs can now easily plead dis-
parate impact claims even though the facts may be difficult to prove or
sustain.339 While the Court noted that a plaintiff who fails to allege spe-
cific facts at the pleading stage could not make a prima facie case of dis-
crimination, this is a relatively low hurdle that is easily overcome.340 In
fact, it is arguable that the Supreme Court's "robust causality require-
ment" is no more than a recitation of the federal Twombly/lIqbal pleading
standard.34'
In Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly342 and Ashcroft v. Iqbal,3 43 the
Supreme Court established a plausibility standard for pleading claims for
relief This standard requires the plaintiff to plead "enough facts to state
a claim to relief that is plausible on its face."34  A claim is deemed
"plausible" when the factual content "allows the court to draw the rea-
sonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct al-
leged.,345 Although the Court may consider legal conclusions within the
339. See J.P. McGuire Boyd, Jr. et al., Supreme Court Upholds Disparate Impact:
What are the Practical Consequences for Mortgage Lenders?, JD SUPRA (June 29, 2015),
http://www.jdsupra.con/legalnews/supreme-court-upholds-disparate-impact-72162/; see
also Tyree Jones, Jr., et al., Supreme Court Upholds 'Disparate Impact' under the FHA
but Emphasizes that Claims Cannot Rely on Statistics Alone, JD SUPRA (June 26, 2015),
http://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/supreme-court-upholds-disparate-impact- 16367/.
340. Boyd, Jr. et al., supra note 339.
341. See Bell At. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007); Aschroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662 (2009).
342. Bell At. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 554 (2007).
343. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 622 (2009).
344. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.
345. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (explaining that "[t]he plausibility standard is not akin to
a 'probability requirement,' but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant
has acted unlawfully. Where a complaint pleads facts that are 'merely consistent with' a
defendant's liability, it 'stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of enti-
tlement to relief'") (citations omitted).
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complaint's framework, such conclusions must be supported by factual
allegations.346 Thus, while the level of factual content necessary to sus-
tain a complaint will vary depending on the context, a plaintiff must
prove the grounds for his or her entitlement to relief beyond mere labels,
conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the claim's elements.
3 47
In the FHA context, the Supreme Court has merely clarified the
pleading standard for disparate impact claims, not enhanced it. For ex-
ample, the Court states that a disparate impact claim relying solely on
statistical disparities must fail if the plaintiff is unable to identify a spe-
cific policy or procedure of the defendant responsible for the alleged
harm.348 This is not an "adequate safeguard" for lenders, but merely a
recitation of the federal pleading standard. Essentially, the Court is re-
quiring plaintiffs to plead the facts of their case that show how the de-
fendant caused the particular harm. This mandate is analogous to the
Twombly/Iqbal standard that instructs plaintiffs to state facts giving rise
to a plausible claim for relief. In almost all civil actions, a plaintiff must
prove a causal connection between the harm suffered and the defendant's
actions. The Supreme Court's reiteration of this well-established stand-
ard adds nothing new to this analysis. Thus, "[a] plaintiff who fails to
allege facts at the pleading stage or produce statistical evidence demon-
strating a causal connection cannot make out a prima facie case of dis-
parate impact ''349 for the sole reason that such a claim would fail the
Twombly/Iqbal standard. This standard has been well settled since 2007,
and the Supreme Court's analysis offers no heightened requirements that
would limit frivolous disparate impact lawsuits.35 °
Furthermore, the readily available disparate impact claim exposes
lenders to unlimited financial liability. Each claim filed against a lender
or mortgage company requires the institution to hire an attorney and pre-
pare either an answer or a motion to dismiss. If the case is not dismissed
at the pleading stage, the lender must engage in several months of dis-
covery, both serving and responding to discovery requests. Assuming no
genuine issues of material fact arise, the lender may then move for sum-
mary judgment. Denial of the motion means the lender must prepare its
346. Id. at 664.
347. Id. at 678.
348. Tex. Dep't of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S.
Ct. 2507, 2523 (2015).
349. Id.
350. See Boyd, Jr. et al., supra note 339 (noting that a plaintiff can satisfy this plead-
ing requirement "by alleging, for example, that a lender's credit score cutoff caused a sta-
tistical disparity in the number of disqualified applicants. Notably missing from the Su-
preme Court's 'robust causality requirement' is any expectation that a plaintiff allege
facts showing that he or she otherwise would have qualified for the loan but for the lend-
er's use of the challenged practice").
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case for trial or negotiate a settlement with the plaintiff, even if the claim
is meritless. Thus, regardless of whether a lender possesses a meritori-
ous defense to the disparate impact claim, it is exposed to significant le-
gal expenses and, potentially, reputational harm.351 In this manner, not
only does the disparate impact doctrine subject lenders to heightened lia-
bility through an increased number of claims, but it also provides plain-
tiffs with unprecedented bargaining power to force settlements for merit-
less claims. For these reasons, this financial nightmare for lenders has
only just begun.
B. I Heard It Through the Grapevine: Will Disparate Impact Expand to
ECOA?
In addition to the immediate implications the disparate impact doc-
trine will produce for FHA claims, it is plausible that the theory will in-
vade another realm of financial services: ECOA. As previously dis-
cussed, ECOA covers automobile lenders as well as mortgagees and
makes it unlawful for a creditor to discriminate against any applicant
during a credit transaction.352 This legislative purpose is undeniably
comparable to the FHA's overarching goals for the housing market.
Given this similarity, the Supreme Court's reasoning in Inclusive Com-
munities may apply with equal force to ECOA, which has been used by
the Obama Administration in conjunction with the FHA against Bank of
America and Wells Fargo.353
The argument disfavoring the expansion of disparate impact to
ECOA centers primarily on a material difference between the wording of
the FlA and ECOA: ECOA does not contain the catchall "otherwise
make unavailable" language that is present in the FHA. The Court relied
heavily on this language in comparing the foundation for disparate im-
pact liability under the FHA with that of Title VII. Particularly, the
Court repeatedly noted that "otherwise make unavailable" served the
same functional purpose as Title VII's "otherwise adversely affect" lan-
guage. By making this comparison, the Court found sufficient similarity
between the phrases to authorize disparate impact. Because ECOA lacks
this critical phraseology, it is conceivable that the Court would apply the
351. See id
352. See 15 U.S.C. § 1691(a)(1) (2012) ("It shall be unlawful for any creditor to dis-
criminate against any applicant, with respect to any aspect of a credit transaction-(1) of
the basis of race, color, religion, national origin, sex or marital status, or age (provided
the applicant has the capacity to contract) .... ").
353. See Greg Stohr, Insurers Disappointed as Supreme Court Backs Disparate Im-
pact Claims, INS. J. (June 25, 2015),
http://www.insurancejoumal.com/news/national/2015/06/25/373004.htm.
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rationale in Smith and rule that there is no textual foundation for dispar-
ate impact liability under ECOA.
Unfortunately for lenders, however, the argument in favor of apply-
ing disparate impact to ECOA is stronger and more persuasive. From a
textual perspective, the rationale for disparate impact's expansion rests
on the Supreme Court's definition of the term "discriminate." Instead of
applying the plain, modem definition of "discriminate" advocated by the
dissent, the majority analyzed statutory language from Harris, a 1979
case.354 In Harris, the Court deciphered the meaning of § 702(b) of the
Emergency School Aid Act ("ESAA"), which authorizes providing fi-
nancial assistance "to meet the special needs incident to the elimination
of minority group segregation and discrimination among students and
faculty in elementary and secondary schools.355 The Court found the
statutory text-particularly the term "discrimination"-to be ambigu-
ous.3 56 This ambiguity sparked an examination into the legislative histo-
ry and purpose of the statute, where the Court concluded that the ESAA
encompassed disparate impact claims.357 Thus, from Harris alone, the
Inclusive Communities Court found that the term "discriminate" can pro-
hibit discriminatory effects in addition to discriminatory intent. Because
the word "discriminate" appears in both the FHA and ECOA, it is con-
ceivable that the Court would apply Harris to ECOA actions and author-
ize disparate impact liability under this similar statutory scheme.358
Further supporting this position is that the CFPB has previously up-
held the applicability of disparate impact to ECOA actions. In an April
18, 2012 Bulletin, the CFPB expressly reaffirmed that "the legal doctrine
of disparate impact remains applicable as the Bureau exercises its super-
vision and enforcement authority to enforce compliance with the ECOA
and Regulation B.",3 59 To arrive at this conclusion, the CFPB relied ex-
tensively on the commentary to Regulation B, which states that an act or
regulation may prohibit conduct that is discriminatory in effect because it
has a disproportionately negative impact on a protected group.360 This
354. Tex. Dep't ofHous. & Cmty. Affairs, 135 S. Ct. at 2518-19 (analyzing statutory
language discussed in Bd. of Educ. of City Sch. Dist. of N.Y. v. Harris, 444 U.S. 130
(1979)).
355. Emergency School Aid Act of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1601(b) (1972) (repealed);
Harris, 444 U.S. at 132.
356. See Harris, 444 U.S. at 140, 152.
357. Id. at 141.
358. See Jones, Jr., et al., supra note 339 (explaining this concept).
359. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, CFPB BULLETIN 2012-04 (FAIR LENDING):
LENDING DISCRIMINATION 1 (2012),
http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201404_cfpbbulletinlendingdiscrimination.pdf.
360. Id.; see 12 C.F.R. pt. 202, Supp. I, § 202.6, 6(a)-2 ("The Act and regulation
may prohibit a creditor practice that is discriminatory in effect because it has a dispropor-
tionately negative impact on a prohibited basis, even though the creditor has no intent to
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explanation, however, is problematic because the actual text of ECOA
does not include effects-based language. The CFPB's analysis is based
solely on commentary to ECOA's implementing legislation. Regulation
B was issued by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System,
not Congress. Therefore, it is improper to use the legislative history and
commentary of Regulation B to determine congressional intent at the
time ECOA was passed.36' Such reasoning is equivalent to arguing that
disparate impact under the FHA is authorized by HUD's effects-based
rule.
In addition to the broad position taken by the CFPB in its April
2012 Bulletin, the CFPB has already found financial institutions liable
under ECOA for providing Spanish speaking consumers with different
financial products than non-Spanish speaking clients.362 For example,
the CFPB held a financial servicer liable under ECOA for charging high-
er interest rates on loans to Hispanic borrowers.363 Similarly, a financial
services institution violated ECOA by discriminating against consumers
on the basis of national origin and excluding all individuals with Puerto
Rico mailing addresses from debt relief offers.36 In late 2013, the CFPB
forced Ally Financial to pay a $98 million settlement after finding dis-
criminatory effects in Ally Financial's use of dealer reserve.365 Although
it is unclear whether these actions involved intentional discrimination or
discriminatory effects, it is obvious that the CFPB has become actively
involved in regulating discriminatory conduct in the financial services
industry, particularly under ECOA.
discriminate and the practice appears neutral on its face, unless the creditor practice
meets a legitimate business need that cannot reasonably be achieved as well by means
that are less disparate in their impact.").
361. See John L. Culhane, Jr. & Christopher J. Willis, CFPB Confirms Plans to Use
"Disparate Impact" to Prove Lending Discrimination, CFPB MONITOR (Apr. 18, 2012),
http://www.cfpbmonitor.com/2012/04/18/cfpb-confirms-plans-to-use-disparate-impact-
to-prove-lending-discrimination/.
362. See Gerald Sachs et al., Regulatory Scrutiny of Language Discrimination in the
Marketing and Offering of Consumer Financial Products and Services, PAUL HASTINGS
(Apr. 20, 2015), http://www.paulhastings.com/publications-items/details/?id=0601e469-
2334-6428-81 lc-ff00004cbded; see also Hannah Lutz, Supreme Court Ruling Could Fa-




363. Sachs et al., supra note 362.
364. Id.
365. Hannah Lutz, Has High Court Raised Bar for CFPB in Auto Bias Cases?, AU-
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Moreover, while anticipating the Supreme Court's ruling on dispar-
ate impact under the FHA, the CFPB went as far as to claim that the
Court's ruling in Inclusive Communities would have very little impact on
the regulation of claims under ECOA.366 In fact, less than one month af-
ter the Court issued the Inclusive Communities opinion, the CFPB an-
nounced a high-profile ECOA disparate impact action.3 67 According to
American Banker and Asset Finance International, the CFPB took action
against Honda for unintentional discrimination in its automotive lending
368practices. Specifically, the automotive giant is accused of discrimina-
tory auto loan pricing arising from its dealer compensation practices, in-
cluding high interest rates.369 Interestingly, however, the CFPB did not
impose civil monetary penalties against Honda, but rather developed a
structured remediation plan.370  As the rationale for this decision, the
CFPB credited Honda's agreement to "to reduce its dealer markup cap
from as high as 2.25% to as low as 1.00%.,,37l Thus, the Court's decision
in Inclusive Communities has "undoubtedly provided the [CFPB] with
some comfort," regarding the use of disparate impact, and has already
resulted in one high-profile consent order. 372
366. See, e.g., Special Alert: Disparate Impact Under the Equal Credit Opportunity
Act After Inclusive Communities, BUCKLEY SANDLER LLP (June 27, 2015),
http://www.buckleysandler.com/news-detai/special-alert-disparate-impact-under-the-
equal-credit-opportunity-act-after-inclusive-communities ("When certiorari was granted
in Inclusive Communities, senior officials from the CFPB and DOJ made clear that they
would continue to enforce the disparate impact theory under the Equal Credit Opportuni-
ty Act (ECOA) even if the Supreme Court held that disparate-impact claims were not
cognizable under the FHA."); Hannah Lutz, Will CFPB's Use of Disparate Impact be




367. Joe Rodriguez, CFPB Brings First ECOA Disparate Impact Action Post-





368. Rachel Witkowski, CFPB Nears Landmark Victory Against Three Large Auto
Lenders, AMERICAN BANKER (June 30, 2015),
http://www.americanbanker.com/news/law-regulation/cfpb-nears-landmark-victory-
against-three-large-auto-lenders- 1075179-1 .html; Pat Sweet, Disparate Impact Investiga-
tions by CFPB, ASSET FIN. INT'L (July 3, 2015),
http://www.assetfinanceeurope.com/index.php/global-news/americas/news-americas-
2/11946-disparate-impact-investigations-by-cfpb.
369. Rodriguez, supra note 367.
370. Id.; see In re Am. Honda Fin. Corp., 2015-CFPB-0014 (July 14, 2015),
http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201507_cfpbconsent-order-honda.pdf.
371. Rodriguez, supra note 367.
372. Id.
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Regardless of how the Supreme Court would actually rule on dis-
parate impact under ECOA, the holding in Inclusive Communities is un-
settled and sufficiently ambiguous regarding its expansion to ECOA to
allow plaintiffs and the CFPB to file suit under this theory; nothing limit
an ambitious plaintiff from asserting an ECOA disparate impact claim
and forcing lenders to litigate such claims in court. This course of action
will undoubtedly force lenders to incur legal fees in defending these suits
and, again, may cause reputational damage. Thus, it is highly probable
that the CFPB and individual consumers will use Inclusive Communities
to initiate disparate impact actions under ECOA to force big settlements
from lenders. The CFPB's prior precedent on the issue, its pending
ECOA case in light of Inclusive Communities, and the seemingly inde-
structible doctrine of disparate impact itself all lend credence to the posi-
tion that lenders should fully expect effects-based liability under ECOA.
Therefore, mortgage servicers and lenders must closely monitor their in-
ternal fair lending practices and incorporate regular statistical analysis
into their procedures to minimize the potential for significant financial
liability and exposure.
C. Lenders' Kryptonite: The Rise of UDAAP to Curb Discriminatory
Lending
Finally, the Inclusive Communities decision may serve as a catalyst
for the CFPB's prosecution of disparate impact claims under UDAAP.
The UDAAP standard is incredibly amorphous and alterable at he
CFPB's will, ruining any attempt by lenders to comply with clear regula-
tory standards. As a "know it when [you] see it" standard, UDAAP
evolves on a daily basis in conjunction with judicial precedent and con-
sumer complaints. The unfettered authority provided to the CFPB to
remedy "unfair," "abusive," and "deceptive" conduct means that lenders
may face liability for disparate impact not only from the FHA but also
from UDAAP. Nothing limits lender liability for discriminatory conduct
solely to the FHA. It is thus readily conceivable that the CFPB would
classify discriminatory effects as "unfair" conduct and prosecute viola-
tions under UDAAP's regulatory framework.373
373. See Dana Lumsden & Bethany Corbin, Fair Lending Law Litigation and Com-
pliance: An Uncertain Future for the Financial Services Industry, MORTG. COMPLIANCE
MAG. (May 2, 2015), http://www.mortgagecompliancemagazine.com/featured/fair-
lending-law-litigation-and-compliance-an-uncertain-future-for-the-financia-services-
industry/ ("Additionally, it may become common to tie alleged fair lending violations to
the Unfair, Deceptive, or Abusive Acts or Practices Act (UDAAP). It is conceivable that
consumers and regulators will argue that the effects of alleged discriminatory lending
practices could result in unfair advantages prohibited by UDAAP.").
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Assuming the CFPB prosecutes disparate impact actions, financial
services institutions face a heightened potential for double liability. Not
only will lenders be liable for damages and remediation pursuant to a
federal court order or settlement agreement, but they will also endure
regulatory fines that can reach up to $1 million per day for knowing vio-
lations of the law.374 In 2014, for example, at least six of the CFPB's en-
forcement actions resulted in penalties greater than $5 million, with two
actions producing penalties greater than $10 million. 375 This unlimited
potential for arbitrary liability thus exposes lenders to significant finan-
cial risk under UDAAP's regulatory framework. This is particularly
worrisome given that the CFPB can alter UDAAP's applicability at
whim and without notice to the public. Additionally, if the CFPB takes
this course of action, states may be able to initiate suit under their own
local consumer protection statutes, exposing lenders to liability not only
from borrowers and the CFPB, but also from state agencies. Thus, a de-
cision by the CFPB to classify discriminatory effects as "unfair" could be
the kryptonite that threatens the stability of the financial services indus-
try. When the dust settles from the destruction, it will be consumers and
remaining bank employees that are left to pick up the pieces-not he ac-
tivist Court that purposefully pushed the first domino.
In light of these financial and reputational risks, lenders and mort-
gage servicers should implement comprehensive monitoring systems that
track and report the effects that lending practices have on minorities and
protected individuals. This system should involve a high level statistical
analysis that warns of impending disparities. In the event that a disparity
is discovered, the lender should ensure that it has a viable and believable
business objective that is furthered by tthe discriminatory practice. In the
event that such justification does not exist, the lender should take imme-
diate corrective action to eliminate the statistical imbalance before the
CFPB or affected consumers investigate and file suit.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court has at last conclusively settled the viability of
disparate impact claims under the FHA. In what can only be described
as a major win for the Obama Administration and civil rights activists,
374. Martin Bishop, Regulatory: The CFPB "s UDAAP Deceptive Standard Does Not
Require Knowledge or Intent, INSIDE COUNSEL (Mar. 20, 2013),
http://www.insidecounsel.com/2013/03/20/regulatory-the-cfpbs-udaap-deceptive-
standard-does.
375. Joseph L. Barloon & Anand S. Raman, CFPB Defines 'Unfair,' 'Deceptive'
and 'Abusive' Practices Through Enforcement Activity, SKADDEN, ARPS, SLATE,
MEAGHER & FLOM (Jan. 2015), https://www.skadden.com/insights/cfpb-defines-unfair-
deceptive-and-abusive-practices-through-enforcement-activity.
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the Court's opinion endorsed a broad interpretation of the terms "dis-
criminate" and "otherwise make unavailable." To authorize disparate
impact recovery under this framework, the Court twisted the FHA's plain
language and legislative amendments to create an unrecognizable statuto-
ry scheme. Given that disparate impact lacks a textual foundation under
the FHA and contains no parallel language warranting use of the Griggs
analysis, the Court should have followed its decision in Smith and pre-
vented disparate impact liability unless expressly provided for in the
FHA's text.
Nonetheless, the authorization of disparate impact claims under the
FHA is conclusively settled for the foreseeable future. This decision,
however, will produce far-reaching and long-term consequences for the
financial services industry. Lenders will be forced to defend meritless
disparate impact suits that plaintiffs can easily allege, leading to in-
creased litigation costs and reputational damage. Although the Supreme
Court maintains it has implemented a "robust causality" requirement, this
restriction imposes no heightened pleading requirements beyond those
established in Twombly and Iqbal. Moreover, the heightened risk of liti-
gation costs may persuade some lenders to settle disparate impact claims,
even where the lender possesses a meritorious defense.
In addition to increased litigation concerns, lenders also face the
threat of disparate impact's expansion to ECOA. While ECOA does not
contain the "otherwise make unavailable" language relied upon by the
Supreme Court, its purpose mirrors that of the FHA. Additionally, its
reference to discrimination is nearly identical to the FlA. It is entirely
possible that consumers and the CFPB will initiate disparate impact ac-
tions under ECOA while the law in this area remains unsettled. Most
importantly, however, the authorization of FHA disparate impact claims
means that the CFPB may be able to classify discriminatory effects in
lending as "unfair" under UDAAP. UDAAP's unrestricted application
and hefty damage awards make it a potent tool for ensuring lender com-
pliance above and beyond the regulatory minimums. Accordingly, lend-
ers should prepare for an influx of disparate impact claims under the
FHA, ECOA, and UDAAP, which will be costly to defend or settle.
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